The V-22 tilt rotor, a comparison with existing Coast Guard aircraft. by Mahaffey, Jay Douglas.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1991
The V-22 tilt rotor, a comparison with existing Coast
Guard aircraft.
Mahaffey, Jay Douglas.








Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
The V-22 Tilt Rotor, A Comparison
with Existing Coast Guard Aircraft
by
Jay Douglas JVlahaffey
Lieutenant Commander, United States Coast Guard
B.S. , United States Coast Guard Academy, 1977
Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of





SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
la REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
1b RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
2a SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY
2b DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
3 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)





la NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School
6c ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
7b ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, CA 93943-5000




9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
8c ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 10 SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS
Program tlernent N^, Project Nc Work unit Accession
Number
1 1 TITLE (Include Security Classification)
THE V-22 TILT ROTOR, A COMPARISON WITH EXISTING COAST GUARD AIRCRAFT
I2 personal author(S) Jay Douglas Mahaffey













18 SUBJECT TERMS (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
V-22, Tilt Rotor, Coast Guard Aircraft, Performance Characteristics,
Cost Comparisons, Employment Stategies, Economic and Political Issues
19 ABSTRACT (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
The ("oast Guard Office of Aviation Flans and Programs continues to receive inquiries from several sources about the service's intentions
concerning the V-22 tilt rotor aircraft. Officially, decsion makers acknowledge thai tilt rotor capabilities could be readily adaptable to the
service's missions, but acquisition of the V-22 will not be contemplated unless the aircraft is first fielded by a Department of Defense component.
This thesis serves as a preliminary inquiry into till rotor applications for the Coast Guard. The purpose of the study is to determine the
implications of a favorable V-22 production decsion on the Coast Guard's current mix of aircraft. As background material the thesis reviews the
history of tilt rotor development and outlines the key economic issues at the center of the public policy debate likely to decide the V-22's future.
Then, the V-22 Osprey is compared with each aircraft already in Coast Guard service. Both performance characteristics and costs are examined.
Lastly, potential Coast Guard V-22 assimilation strategies are reviewed.
20 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT
Pi UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED LJ SAMt AS Kt POKi Q DIICUSEKS
21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Unclassified
22a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL
Professor William R. Gates




DD FORM 1473, 84 MAR 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted
All other editions are obsolete





THE V-22 TILT ROTOR, A COMPARISON






Professor William R. Gates
Professor James E. Suchan
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

ABSTRACT
The Coast Guard Office of Aviation Plans and Programs continues to receive inquiries from
several sources about the service's intentions concerning the V-22 tilt rotor aircraft. Officially,
decision makers acknowledge that tilt rotor capabilities could be readily adaptable to the service's
missions, but acquisition of the V-22 is not contemplated unless the aircraft is first fielded by a
Department of Defense component. This thesis serves as a preliminary inquiry into tilt rotor
applications for the Coast Guard. The purpose of the study is to determine the implications of a
favorable V-22 production decision on the Coast Guard's current mix of aircraft. As background
material, the thesis reviews the history of tilt rotor development and outlines the key economic
issues at the center of the public policy debate likely to decide the V-22's future. Then, the V-22
Osprey is compared with each aircraft already in Coast Guard service. Both performance
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This thesis serves as a preliminary inquiry into the feasibility of
acquiring the V-22 tilt rotor aircraft for Coast Guard aviation. The
study is predicated on the assumption that the V-22 Osprey will enter
production and become available to organizations outside the Department of
Defense.
This chapter briefly addresses the Coast Guard's reaction to previous
improvements in aircraft technology and outlines the objectives of the
research. The chapter also includes a section on literature reviewed,
scope and limitations and the organization of the thesis.
A . BACKGROUND
Since its infancy in 1915, one of Coast Guard aviation's central
functions has been to locate the lost, aid the injured and save the
distressed on the high seas and navigable waters of the United States. As
time passed and the responsibilities of the Coast Guard increased, the air
arm's job expanded as well. Today, Coast Guard aviation supports all of
the service's primary missions: search and rescue, enforcement of laws and
treaties, marine environmental protection, defense readiness, ice
operations and marine safety. In turn, this mission variety means that
sortie objectives are extremely diversified. Coast Guard aircraft fly
port security patrols, look for pollution, map oil spills, operate with
Navy battle groups and track suspicious boats and airplanes attempting to
enter the country illegally.
While still standing alert duty, performing searches and plucking
survivors from the sea, the service's air resources provide important
transportation and logistics support to other elements of the Coast Guard.
These activities include flying provisions to remote Coast Guard stations,
transporting pollution response forces and equipment to spills in the
United States and around the world, conducting shipboard helicopter
operations and ferrying repair crews and materials to isolated navigation
aids. In summary, the operating arena calls for flexible, versatile and
cost effective aircraft. Some would say the Coast Guard represents an
ideal environment for the V-22 tilt rotor aircraft.
From humble beginnings, the scope and complexity of Coast Guard air
operations has increased dramatically. Several times during its 76 year
history Coast Guard decision makers have demonstrated a willingness to
become involved with aeronautical advancements that could enhance
operations or improve service. Although its still unclear whether or not
the V-22 forebodes a new era in aviation, tilt rotor technology could
potentially rival past aeronautical innovations placed in Coast Guard
service.
In 1916, Bryon R. Newton, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury,'
Glen H. Curtiss, pioneer aircraft designer, and Captain Chiswell,
commanding officer of the cutter Onondaga, discussed the practicality of
building a flying "lifeboat" plane. Although the original idea to attach
wings, engine and propeller to an actual surf boat proved unfeasible,
Curtiss did go on to build several successful boat hulled airplanes. (Air
Search and Rescue: 63 Years of Aerial Lifesaving , 1978, pp. 3-19)
Recognizing the helicopter's potential, the Coast Guard designated Air
Station Brooklyn as a rotary wing training site late in 1943. In January
of the next year, Commander Erickson made the first life saving helicopter
flight by transporting two cases of blood plasma from New York City to a
hospital in Sandy Hook, New Jersey. With the end of World War II, the
Coast Guard gradually added more helicopters to the seaplanes and shore
based aircraft already in operation. (Air Search and Rescue: 63 Years of
Aerial Lifesaving , 1978, pp. 3-19)
By the 1960's, other significant changes occurred in Coast Guard
aviation. Piston powered helicopters were retired in favor of amphibious
'in 1967 the Coast Guard was moved to the Department of
Transportation.
helicopters with turboshaft engines. Turboprop aircraft appeared as well.
As the late 1970 's approached, the Coast Guard modernized by acquiring a
pure jet, a derivative of the Falcon 20 business airplane.
More recently, in the mid 1980' s, the service began replacing its
amphibious helicopters. Although the replacement helicopters can not land
on the water, they possess greater speed and reliability than their
amphibious counterparts. With rescue swimmers aboard, they remain every
bit as capable as their water landing predecessors.
Currently, much of Coast Guard aviation's work is performed by four
types of aircraft (see Appendix A for aircraft diagrams including the V-
22). This mix includes:
• The HH-65A, a short range and recovery helicopter.
• The HH-60J, a medium range and recovery helicopter.
• The HU-25A : , a medium range surveillance aircraft.
• The HC-130H, a long range surveillance aircraft.
Since this fleet of aircraft is relatively young, a favorable Coast Guard
V-22 acquisition determination probably depends on three key factors:
• A favorable production decision by the Department of Defense.
• Significant performance advantages over existing air assets.
• Unit costs within Coast Guard budget constraints.
Although the Coast Guard has a history of upgrading and improving its
air resources, the relative newness of the service's air fleet may make
near term procurement of the V-22 extremely uneconomical. On the other
hand, potentially lower maintenance costs combined with the tilt rotor's
unique capabilities could make it a very cost effective air resource.
Because a viable tilt rotor could have a major impact on current air
resource employment strategies, the Coast Guard needs to compare it with
•"B" and "C" models are also flown in the Coast Guard,
aircraft already in service and consider what role or roles it might play
in Coast Guard air operations.
B. OBJECTIVES
This study will determine the implications of a favorable Department
of Defense V-22 production decision on the Coast Guard's existing mix of
aircraft. As background material, the thesis reviews the history of tilt
rotor development and outlines the key economic issues at the center of
the public policy debate likely to decide the V-22*s future. Then, the
V-22 Osprey is compared with each aircraft already in Coast Guard service.
The goal of the research is to determine if these comparisons suggest an
affordable role for the V-22 in Coast Guard aviation.
The following specific questions will be addressed:
• What is the history of tilt rotor development?
• What are the major economic arguments shaping the tilt rotor debate?
• In terms of cost and performance, how does the V-22 compare with
aircraft already in the Coast Guard inventory?
• Can the V-22 replace more than one fielded aircraft type?
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
For the past 20 years the Coast Guard has operated with the following
air assets: a short range helicopter, a medium range helicopter, a medium
range patrol plane and a long range transport. However, the V-22 Osprey
could conceivably make this aircraft mix obsolete. Although the direction
of the tilt rotor program is unsettled, this study attempts to compare the
performance characteristics of the Osprey and its projected costs to Coast
Guard aircraft already in the field. The study is subject to the
following assumptions:
• The number of aircraft potentially procured by the Coast Guard would
not appreciably change V-22 unit costs.
• Learning curve trends and contract incentives associated with
potential orders beyond those currently proposed by the V-22 program
office were not considered in the analysis.
• With the exception of cost of living increases, fiscal constraints
will demand that expenses remain commensurate with today's funding
levels
.
• The V-22 Osprey is produced in quantities reflected in the Naval Air
System Command's advance vertical lift Selected Acquisition Report of
December 31, 1988. The report calls for a production run of 663
aircraft
.
• Aircraft types presently in the Coast Guard inventory will remain
available in the foreseeable future. HH-60 helicopters and C-130
aircraft are being produced by Sikorsky and Lockheed respectively.
Although Coast Guard models of the HH-65 and HU-25 are out of
production, commercial variants of these aircraft are still being
built.
In some cases, available research time and the use of non computerized
cost data limited the breadth of the study. Spares and upgrade costs were
not available for the HH-65A, the HU-25A and the HC-130H. The V-22's
operating and maintenance costs were under internal review by the Marine
Corps and not available to the author. Consequently, the thesis does not
calculate each aircraft's life cycle costs. Instead, the study attempts
to highlight the strengths and weaknesses associated with each aircraft
type.
D. LITERATURE REVIEW
Information about the V-22 Osprey was collected from the Naval Air
Systems Command Joint Service's Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft Program
Office and publications provided by the aircraft's manufactures, Bell and
Boeing. Several periodicals and professional journals were consulted to
learn the history of tilt rotor development and to ascertain the major
issues at the center of the tilt rotor debate. V-22 cost information was
extracted from the Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft Selected
Acquisition Report, dated December 31, 1988 (see Appendix B). Data on
Coast Guard aircraft was supplied by the Coast Guard Aviation Plans,
Programming and Budgeting Office in Washington, D.C. A list of references
is provided at the end of the thesis.
E. ORGANIZATION
The body of this thesis is organized into eight chapters. Each
chapter addresses a different aspect of the research questions.
Chapter II looks at the history of tilt rotor technology. It provides
a foundation for understanding the risks and benefits associated with this
aircraft design concept.
Chapter III outlines the public policy issues at the heart of the tilt
rotor debate. Although production is not assured, several members of
Congress appear to be moving to introduce legislation that would overturn
Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney's decision to cancel the V-22 program.
Chapter IV briefly reviews the service's aviation's requirements for
the short range recovery, the medium range recovery, the medium range
surveillance and the long range surveillance resources. These
requirements serve as a basic framework for outlining potential tilt rotor
applications in the Coast Guard.
Chapter V examines data contained in the National Search and Rescue
Data Base to determine whether or not there is a need for the V-22. Both,
historic response levels and the rescue site's distance offshore are
addressed.
Chapter VI compares the V-22 with existing Coast Guard aircraft. A
series of performance and cost categories highlight the strengths and
weaknesses of each aircraft type.
Chapter VII offers ideas for assimilating the V-22 into Coast Guard
aviation air operations. The Osprey is evaluated in the following roles:
• Short range and recovery.
• Medium range and recovery.
• Medium range patrol and surveillance.
• Long range patrol, surveillance and transport.
• Use as a gap filling resource.
Chapter VIII summarizes the study. It draws some general conclusions
about whether or not the V-22 is affordable and recommends areas for
further analysis. Factors that might influence the Osprey ' s contribution
to future mixes of Coast Guard aircraft are also addressed. Finally,
areas of additional research are proposed.
II. TILT ROTOR HISTORY
This chapter provides a historical overview of the efforts made to
merge the hover capabilities of the helicopter with the high speed
characteristics of the airplane. The chapter is divided into three
sections. Drawing heavily on R. W. Prouty's resource (1984), the first
section reviews the early design attempts to combine the helicopter and
airplane. Subseguent sections of the chapter discuss validation of the
tilt rotor concept and the V-22 itself.
A. EARLY HISTORY
Although some current periodicals, government officials and members
of Congress hail the V-22 as new technology, it actually represents the
culmination of several design efforts that began approximately 40 years
ago (if the V-22 is produced, one could reasonably argue that the Osprey
will not only dramatically influence warfare and recovery operations, but
change the scope of the short haul commuter airline transportation system
as well). For over four decades a number of aircraft designs sought to
combine the vertical take off and landing capabilities of the helicopter
with the speed, endurance and reliability of fixed wing aircraft. These
in flight conversion concepts included compound autogiros, tilt wing and
tilt rotor aircraft. In retrospect, the most promising designs were the
tilt wing and tilt rotor aircraft.
1 . THE TILT WING CONCEPT
The tilt wing appeared to be a "simpler" and "more pragmatic"
approach than the tilt rotor. The Boeing Vertol Model 76, also known as
the VZ-2, was the first tilt wing to fly. After a contract award in 1956,
the VZ-2 design called for a Lycoming YT53-L-1 turboshaft engine to be
firmly mounted on the aircraft's fuselage. The engine drove two rotors
mounted on a pivoting wing as well as twin fans. One fan was attached to
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the rear fuselage and the other to a T-tail empennage. At slow speeds or
in a hover the twin fans controlled pitch and yaw. In forward flight,
with the wing pivoted forward, control was maintained by using
conventional ailerons, elevators and a rudder. The VZ-2 made its first
vertical flight in April of 1957. At the conclusion of testing in 1959,
it had successfully completed 34 transitions to forward flight.
(Thornborough, 1990, pp. 1-5)
Follow-on tilt wing prototypes, including the Hiller X-18, the
LTV-Hiller-Ryan XC-142 and the Canadian CL-84, were evaluated, but none
ever quite reached production. Lateral instability, generated when strong
cross winds or the rotor downwash caused the wings to dip, hover
inefficiency and a series of fatal crashes effectively ended tilt wing
research by 1974 (Thornborough, 1990, pp. 1-5). However, recent advances
in stability augmentation and construction materials are renewing interest
in the tilt wing design concept.
2 . THE TILT ROTOR CONCEPT
In a program that began in 1950, the Air Force hoped to develop
a fast flying helicopter for itself and the Army. Since the helicopters
of the day flew at speeds under 100 knots, engineers naturally
contemplated helicopter like designs that might achieve the speeds of
fixed wing aircraft. Prouty indicates that the "convertiplane" project
began at Wright Field in Ohio. Three aircraft manufactures, McDonnell
Corporation, Sikorsky and Bell received contracts to construct competing
"convertiplane" aircraft. These competing designs became known as the
XV-1 (McDonnell), XV-2 (Sikorsky) and the XV-3 (Bell).
McDonnell's XV-1 was designed like an airplane with twin tail
booms, wings and a pressure jet rotor system. For high speed flight, a
550 horsepower Continental piston engine powered a fixed pitch propeller.
At slow speeds or in a hover, the engine drove a pair of compressors that
supplied air to the three-bladed rotor system. A fuel line in each of the
three blades fed tip burners that created the thrust necessary to drive
the rotor. The design of the XV-l's horizontal stabilizer allowed it to
align itself with the rotor downwash at slow speeds and function as a
conventional elevator at higher speeds. Ducted fans on each tail boom
were used for directional control in slow speed flight while transitioning
to and from a hover (pressure jet main rotor systems do not require anti-
torque controls). Both ailerons and rudders provided control at high
speeds.
The XV-l's first flight took place in February of 1954. A year
later it successfully converted from helicopter flight to airplane flight
where it attained speeds approaching 174 knots.
Among the XV series aircraft, Sikorsky's proposal was by far the
most advanced. The concept involved a single bladed, counter balanced
pressure jet rotor that could be started or stopped in flight. Propulsion
came from a jet engine that could be directed aft for high speed flight or
into a compressor that provided air for the rotor system in slow speed
flight. At high speeds, lift came from a straight or delta shaped wing.
But, the lack of suitable jet engines and concerns over the viability of
an in-flight start-stop rotor system kept the concept on the drawing
board.
The XV-3 was a true tilt rotor and the forerunner of the V-22
design. Bell's entry was powered by single Pratt and Whitney radial
engine installed on the aircraft's fuselage. Through cross shafting in
the wings the engine drove rotor/propellers mounted on each wing.
Conventional airplane controls operated at all times; however, rotor
controls were phased out during transitions to airplane flight.
Early in the program, designers faced the unique engineering
challenge of developing rotors that could function in a hover and act as
high speed propellers when tilted for forward flight. The first XV-3
crashed in 1956 when it experienced rotor system mechanical instability.
After redesigning the rotor system, a second XV-3 prototype entered a
cautious flight test program in 1957. By 1966 it had accomplished 110
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full in flight conversions from helicopter to airplane and achieved
forward airspeeds up to 155 knots (Thornborough, 1990, p. 4).
3 . SUMMARY
The results of the XV program were mixed. The two flying XV
prototypes showed that a helicopter could undergo an in flight transition
and become a moderately fast airplane. Advocates of the XV-3 observed
that the tilt rotor technology was sound. The tilt rotor was almost as
efficient as a helicopter in a hover, and by tilting the rotor/propellers
forward in cruise it eliminated the very high rotor drag associated with
conventional helicopters. At that time, it seemed reasonable to assume
that tilt rotors could achieve twice the helicopter's cruise speed for
about the same power. (The Case for the V-22 Osprey Program, 1990, p. 1)
But the penalties were high. Extra weight reduced performance
and the complex designs generated concerns about reliability and operating
costs. Air Force test pilots found the flying qualities of the XV-1 and
XV-3 good, but considered both aircraft greatly underpowered.
Simultaneously, conventional helicopters were achieving higher speeds and
airplanes were being designed to land and take off on shorter and shorter
runways. Neither the XV-1 or the XV-3 entered production.
B. TILT ROTOR DESIGN VALIDATION
The idea of a hybrid helicopter airplane continued to live through the
late 1960 's. A newly designed rotor blade, incorporating much more twist
and better airframe materials, allowed engineers to envision a 300 knot
tilt rotor. In 1972, Bell received a joint NASA/Army research contract to
develop the XV-15. A far cry from the XV-3, the first XV- 15 rolled out of
the factory on October 22, 1976. A pair of 1,550 shaft horsepower Avco
Lycoming LTC1K-4K turboshaft engines were mounted at the end of the wings
and connected by a mid-wing gearbox and cross-shaft. The aircraft's first
hover took place in May of 1977. After a two years of ground tests and
wind tunnel evaluations, the XV-15 made its first successful conversion on
July 24, 1979. At the conclusion of testing in 1988, the XV-15 had
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significantly expanded the tilt rotor envelope. Accomplishments included
level flight forward speeds of 322 knots, flights to 26,000 feet and more
than 1800 conversions to airplane mode. (Thornborough, 1990, pp. 1-5)
Besides expanding the tilt rotor flight envelope, the XV-15 proof-of-
concept aircraft demonstrated a high degree of safety and reliability.
The technology also validated several other important flight
characteristics:
• Ease of handling and good stability in a hover.
• Continuous operations at intermediate conversion angles which is
useful for short takeoff and landing situations and medium speed
loiter missions.
• Minimal conversion time (approximately 12 seconds).
• No additional pilot workloads making the XV-15 comparable to
helicopters or airplanes.
• Vibration levels at or below those of equivalent helicopters or
turboprop airplanes.
• Single engine operations.
• Improved autorotation capabilities.
• Efficient cruise fuel consumption. {The Case for the V-22 Osprey
Program, 1990, p. 2)
With a successful June 1981 exhibit at the Paris Air Show, the XV-15
captured the attention of several military, political and aeronautical
industry leaders. At long last a true vertical takeoff and landing
"airplane" seemed a reality. The stage was set for further tilt rotor
development
.
C. THE V-22 OSPREY
In December 1981, the Department of Defense released a request for
proposals for a Joint Services Advanced Lift Aircraft, designated the JVX.
Bell and Boeing joined forces in April 1982 and submitted a preliminary
JVX proposal in February of the following year. The design was based on
a scaled up version of the XV-15. In April of 1986, the Pentagon awarded
a $1.81 billion fixed price incentive contract for full scale development
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to the Bell and Boeing team. Under the terms of the contract, six
aircraft were ordered. Planning, budgeting and contract administration
would be performed by the Naval Air Systems Command.
After 46 months of design, tooling, fabrication and testing, the V-22
first hovered on March 19, 1989. Achieving a speed of 150 knots at an
altitude of 6,000 feet, the Osprey completed its first full-in-flight
conversion on September 14, 1989. Since that time the flight envelop has
been expanded to 8,300 feet and 280 knots. By the end of February 1990,
85 test flights had accumulated more than 70 flight hours. Even though
much of the 4145 hour flight test program remains, the results are
encouraging. It appears that the V-22 will meet or exceed all the
manufacturing team's performance guarantees. (The Case for the V-22 Osprey
Program, 1990, pp. 4-5)
The Bell-Boeing V-22 is an advanced vertical or short takeoff and
landing aircraft that is made primarily of graphite-epoxy solid laminate
material. The composite structure reduces weight, offers good ballistic
tolerance and is resistant to corrosion. The all composite airframe and
buoyant fuel sponsons give the V-22 fairly good flotation characteristics
that eliminate the need for an emergency flotation system. (The Bell-
Boeing V-22 Osprey Tilt Rotor Aircraft Program, 1990, pp. 1-30)
When operating like a helicopter, control is accomplished by changing
the cyclic-pitch angle on each rotor blade. While hovering, the V-22 can
slide right, left cr rearward at up to 30 knots or move forward at speeds
up to 100 knots. Functioning as an airplane, control is maintained by
using flaperons (at the wings trailing edge) for roll, elevators for pitch
and rudders for yaw. In addition, the V-22 contains a computerized flight
management and fly-by-wire flight control system. It has triple
redundancy and can be used to adjust some flight characteristics by making
software changes only. (The Bell-Boeing Tilt Rotor Aircraft Program, 1990,
pp. 10-11)
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The V-22 is 57.9 feet from nose to tail and 84.5 feet wide with rotors
turning overhead in a horizontal plane. The Osprey ' s short takeoff and
landing maximum gross weight is 59,000 pounds (500 foot runway required).
Its maximum vertical takeoff and landing weight is 47,000 pounds. In the
helicopter mode the V-22 can lift external loads up to 15,000 pounds or
carry an internal payload of 8300 pounds (usable volume 858 cubic feet).
In a word, it is a very versatile aircraft. (The Bell-Boeing Tilt Rotor
Aircraft Program, 1990, pp. 11-12)
Though they incorporate many advanced features, the T406-AD-400
Allison engines mounted on the V-22 are proven 6,000 shaft horsepower
engines. Some of their more impressive attributes are digital electronic
controls, a digital monitoring system, and a vertical lubrication system
for continuous hover operations. According to Bell and Boeing, the
engines 39 field replaceable units can be serviced or changed with ten
tools. Furthermore, the maintenance target is a 35 flight hour or 15 day
inspection cycle. The T406-AD-400 is a derivative of the T56 engines that
power C-130 and P-3 airplanes. However, the gas generator is not
mechanically connected to the power turbine permitting the engines to be
started without engaging the rotor blades. (The Bell-Boeing Tilt Rotor
Aircraft Program, 1990, pp. 19-21)
The V-22 is the product of four decades of research and development
involving the Department of Defense, NASA, and private industry. Many of
its technologies are already proven in conventional helicopters and
airplanes. Currently, the Osprey' s combination of turboprop speeds and a
vertical takeoff or landing capability make it unique among the world's
aircraft
.
Since rapid response, slow flight and recovery capabilities are
intimately entwined with Coast Guard aviation operations, the V-22's
performance characteristics seem well suited for the service. In a
maritime search and rescue role, the V-22 can transit at turboprop speeds,
yet, search and hoist much like a helicopter. Flying law enforcement
14
missions, the Osprey can patrol an area similar in size to that covered by
some conventional fixed wing aircraft, while retaining the ability to
easily identify suspect vessels. Lieutenant Goward called the Coast Guard
and the tilt rotor "a perfect match" (Goward, 1990, pp. 83-85). If the
V-22 is affordable, he may be right.
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III. THE TILT ROTOR DEBATE
In April of 1989 Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney canceled the V-22
program. His decision caused V-22 advocates in Congress, industry and the
Marine Corps to rally in defense of the tilt rotor. Subsequently,
Congress appropriated funds for continued research and development on the
Osprey. Although the program does not enjoy official support from the
Department of Defense, prototypes one through four are undergoing tests.
Prototype number five crashed on June 11, 1991, and prototype number six
is scheduled for completion in September of 1992. At the present time,
the House Armed Services Committee and the House Appropriations Committee
are meeting with their Senate counterparts to decide whether or not to
include $960 million in the fiscal year 1992 budget for six to ten
production representative V-22 aircraft (Gisolo, telephone conversation,
October 25, 1991)
.
This chapter concentrates on several factors that will determine
whether or not the V-22 enters production. First, it examines the
position of the two major stake holders, the Marine Corps and the
Department of Defense, in the tilt rotor debate. Then, the chapter
provides a brief overview of Congressional involvement with the V-22
program as well as the key public policy issues underlying the V-22
debate.
When it comes to deciding the future of the V-22 program, the Marine
Corps, the Department of Defense and Congress have different views about
entering full scale tilt rotor production. For the Marine Corps, the V-22
was to replace the CH-46 helicopter and fulfill medium lift requirements
into the next century. For Secretary Cheney, the problem revolved around
competing defense programs and a declining defense budget. Though
certainly political, Congress' concerns about the V-22 involve balancing
16
national defense priorities, aerospace industry needs and budget
constraints to determine the best course of action for the country.
Since Bell and Boeing have threatened to stop V-22 development without
a firm order from the Department of Defense, the results of the public
policy debate may determine the future of the tilt rotor program. A
Congressional decision to withdraw funding probably means that V-22
development will be delayed or stopped altogether. Consequently, the V-22
may not be available for Coast Guard or commercial use.
A. THE MARINE CORPS POSITION
As part of a force modernization program to improve amphibious assault
capabilities, the Marine Corps wants to replace its aging Boeing CH-46
helicopters with V-22 tilt rotors. While serving as Commandant, General
Gray stated that finding an aircraft to meet medium-lift requirements was
the most pressing issue facing the Marine Corps. The CH-46 is over 28
years old and nearing the end of its useful service life. Since its
introduction, battlefield threats have increased dramatically. Precision
guided munitions and hand held surface-to-air missiles now place the CH-46
and the troops it carries at risk. Despite the Osprey ' s on again off
again status, the Marines consider the V-22 the front running candidate to
replace the CH-46 helicopter. (Donovan and Steigman, March 5, 1990, p. 4)
If the V-22 does not enter production, the Marines have two broad
options for replacing the CH-46:
• Build a new helicopter that matches V-22 performance.
• Use a mix of helicopters already in production.
According to the Marine Corps, neither option will be cheap.
The first alternative is probably the least attractive. Since helicopter
technology is already approaching its design limits, significant advances
may not be possible without an expensive development effort (Donovan and
Steigman, March 5, 1990, p. 4). Furthermore, it may be several years
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before the performance and technological advances already present in the
V-22 are available in another single aircraft.
Even if it can be demonstrated that a new helicopter could meet V-22
performance characteristics, there appears to be little interest among
American aircraft manufactures in building it. The financial risks of
such an undertaking are high and the Defense Department's vacillation with
the V-22 project seems to have cooled industry interest. Moreover, any
effort to push conventional rotary wing design limits to gain what is
already available with the Osprey would probably result in an extremely
expensive venture. Lastly, the time lag associated with a new design
effort further delays CH-46 replacement.
The second option weighs the merits of the V-22 against several
conventional helicopters already in the field. One plan being championed
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense is a mix of CH-53 and UH-60
helicopters. It calls for 376 CH-53's and 590 UH-60's instead of 552 V-
22 's (Donovan and Steigman, March 5, 1990, p. 4). The Marine Corps
countered that this proposal would cost $6 billion more than the V-22
program. The Office of the Secretary of Defense then revised the mix to
225 CH-53 's and 478 UH-60 's. But, the Marines insist that the revision is
flawed because CH-53 's must simultaneously carry double external loads 3
and troops to meet Marine Corps lift requirements (Donovan and Steigman,
March 5, 1990, p. 4). Other Marine Corps objections include:
• Employing the CH-53 in an assault role. 4
• Reducing squad size and equipment loads (currently accommodated by
the CH-46) to be compatible with an UH-60 helicopter.
3The double sling method requires vehicles to be bolted together for
aerial delivery. It reduces lift requirements by increasing aircraft
loads. But, the double sling method impedes the speed and flexibility of
an assault because vehicles must be unbolted before they can be used.
4The CH-53 has a large radar signature and difficulty using the
landing surfaces associated with assault missions.
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The Marines have also urged the Pentagon to consider the V-22 for
other defense related missions. In General Grey's view, V-22 baseline
requirements (an ability to lift internal and external payloads of up to
10,000 pounds, a 200 nautical mile combat radius, and shipboard
compatibility) make the Osprey an extremely versatile aircraft capable of
meeting needs in other U.S. military components. As the Marines point
out, a dual use approach avoids costly parallel acquisitions programs.
Understandably, the Marine Corps baseline requirements are closely
related to their over-the-horizon amphibious assault mission. The over-
the-horizon principle is important. The farther from shore assault waves
can be launched, the greater the overall area where they can potentially
land. With a greater speed and range than conventional helicopters, the
Osprey enhances tactical surprise and forces any adversary to defend a
much larger area ashore.
The V-22 also makes detection and forward engagement of the amphibious
task force much more complicated. Its over-the horizon vertical-lift
capability significantly increases the flexibility and responsiveness of
deployed Marine Expeditionary Units. 5 The central issue for the Marine
Corps is the cost and relative effectiveness of each CH-46 alternative.
Despite repeated service life extension programs, the CH-46 helicopter is
old and technologically obsolete. The Marines favor the V-22. They
insist that the marginal benefits of the V-22 exceed the marginal costs.
While their opinion receives strong support in some quarters (especially
for the amphibious assault mission), 6 the V-22 may or may not be the
right choice for the Department of Defense or the country at large.
5The primary method of deploying Marine forces.
6The Janus Simulation, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the
Institute for Defense Analysis study are two examples.
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B. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POSITION
Within the Department of Defense, the V-22 program was canceled on the
advice of Dr. David Chu, Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation. He
advised Secretary Cheney that a mix of helicopters was more cost effective
than buying the tilt rotor weapons system. (Flanagan, 1990, pp. 39-43)
In economic terms, Secretary Cheney faced a constrained optimization
problem. The Secretary's job was to allocate the defense budget among
several competing programs. In his opinion the B-2, stealth bomber, the
strategic defense initiative and the advanced tactical fighter offered
greater benefits than those gained from the V-22 (Lake, 1989, pp. 23-28).
In his view, the opportunity costs of continuing the tilt rotor program
were too high. Since adequate funding for the V-22 was only possible by
cutting something else, the Secretary canceled the Osprey.
In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on April 25,
1989, Secretary Cheney defended his decision to cancel the Osprey. He
cited cost figures prepared by the Department of Defense, the limited
mission of the V-22, the shrinking Defense budget, decreasing V-22
procurement quantities, and delays as factors in his decision. While
testifying he stated:
In examining the missions of the V-22, we have concluded that,
although the V-22 does provide a marginal increase in capability over
a narrow range of missions, we can adequately perform those missions
by other means. For the most part, we are already performing those
missions today and will continue to do so in the future. In
addition, if we had retained the V-22 in the budget, we would have
been required to remove other programs with value over a broader
range of defense missions (Congress, House Armed Services Committee,
Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for FY90: H.R. 2461,
101st Cong., 1st sess., April 25, 1989, p. 135).
The V-22 alternative proposed by the Defense Department's Program
Analysis and Evaluation Office involved a combination of CH-53 and UH-60
helicopters. Although disputed by the Marine Corps for the reasons cited
in the previous section, the study indicated that this mix of helicopters
could perform the same mission as the V-22 with an estimated three to five
billion dollars in savings over 20 years.
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When questioned about abandoning an investment of more than two
billion dollars in the V-22, Secretary Cheney responded:
The research and development investment for the V-22 is not lost.
If there is a commercial market for the aircraft, that effort will
have been aided in no small part by the advances we made in tilt-
rotor technology. The broader issue we face, however, is how to get
the most defense — current and future — from limited budgetary
resources available (Congress, House Armed Services Committee,
Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for FY90: H.R. 2461,
101st Cong., 1st sess., April 25, 1989, p. 122)
Clearly, Secretary Cheney focused on defense programs at large rather than
the Marine Corps amphibious assault mission alone. A national perspective
about tilt technology was left to Congress.
C. CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS
Both the Defense Department and the Marine Corps are engaged in a high
powered debate to win approval for their respective positions. Any
objective Osprey production decision based on Marine Corps needs and
defense requirements would be difficult enough. Add in the forces of
military parochialism, pork barrel congressional politics, a declining
defense budget, special interest groups and expectations for a peace
dividend and the decision becomes extremely complex.
For the Marine Corps, several sources indicate that the V-22 is the
superior alternative in terms of cost and capabilities. 7 But, this
conclusion is not necessarily true for other applications of tilt rotor
technology. For example, even if the V-22 becomes an operational aircraft
within the Department of Defense, there is no guarantee that the tilt
rotor will become a commercial success. The question remains, can the
country afford a major new weapon system in the face of a declining budget
and an uncertain threat?
In broad terms, two major forces, politics and economics, are creating
different assessments about the same weapons system. Not surprisingly,
7Again, the Janus Simulation and Institute for Defense Analysis study
are two examples.
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with major V-22 contractors in Pennsylvania, Texas and Indiana and given
the strength of aerospace industry lobbies, Capitol Hill has continuously
opposed Secretary Cheney and supported the Osprey. Interestingly, it
appears more likely that a V-22 production decision will hinge on a
combination of political factors and economic issues rather than pure tilt
rotor performance advantages over the CH-46 helicopter. These matters
include:
• Commercial applications.
• Externalities associated with the introduction of the V-22 into the
commercial market place. 8
• Foreign competition and trade.
• Unemployment.
• The national defense industrial base.
• Contractor relations.
Politics and interservice rivalries aside, a purely economic analysis
regarding V-22 production should consider the marginal benefits and
marginal costs associated with the issues listed above as well as those
related to specific Marine Corps needs and Department of Defense
requirements. Although the outcome is not yet clear, the following
paragraphs discuss political and economic considerations that are
influencing Congressional members as they wrestle with the V-22 production
decision.
1. COMMERCIAL APPLICATIONS
In 1981 the XV-15 demonstration of tilt-rotor technology at the
Paris Air Show captured the attention of the aviation world. For the
first time it appeared feasible to combine the vertical lift capabilities
8 Steven E. Rhodes defines externalities as effects on third parties
which are not transmitted through the price system. Generally,
externalities consist of incidental by-products associated with a person's
or firm's activities. Their impact on the economy may either be positive
or negative (Rhodes, 1990, p. 67).
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of helicopters with the forward speed of conventionally powered military
and civilian aircraft.
But, commercial aviation operators seem reluctant to accept the Osprey
until it proves itself in the Marine Corps or some other Department of
Defense component. A major concern is cost. In 1986, Boeing Vertol '
s
President Joe Mallen warned that a commercial derivative of the V-22 cheap
enough for public use was not yet available (Harvey, May 1989, p. 15).
Nevertheless, some aviation industry analysts believe that a tilt rotor
aircraft seating 40 to 44 passengers is reasonably possible.
Additionally, they suggest that many of the arguments being used against
the V-22 are similar to those that confronted the Boeing 707 at the
beginning of the commercial jet age. When the Boeing 707, a variant of
the Air Force's KC-135 tanker, was introduced, many people believed it did
not make economic sense. Yet, it became one of the most successful
commercial aircraft ever.
What would be gained by adapting tilt rotor aircraft to the
commercial aircraft business? Initially, tilt rotor aircraft could
replace existing commuter aircraft that connect small cities with hub
airports ("The V-22 Tilt-rotor Aircraft," January 15, 1990, p. 15).
Potentially, air transportation from city center to city center could
become viable by using the hybrid airplane/helicopter to directly link
downtown areas. In another scenario, the V-22 could connect major
airports to metropolitan centers or key business districts in the
surrounding area. According to John Leverton, Operational Development and
Environmental Projects Officer for EH Industries, air traffic congestion
in and around large metropolitan areas will create a market for vertical
passenger flight service by the mid 1990 's (Leverton, January/February
1990, pp. 26-32). In addition, travellers may be willing to pay a premium
fare to avoid the excessive time delays that affect many major airports.
Both a Port Authority of New York/New Jersey study and a British
Aerospace study indicated that a civilian tilt-rotor (CTR) was feasible
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provided the aircraft could be made affordable ("Civil Tilt Rotor
Studies," June 1990, p. 36). In particular, the British study showed
that 11 CTR's with 31 seats and 65% load factor could gain a 30% market
penetration on routes linking London, Paris and Glasgow. The Market
potential for CTR's in the United Kingdom was 30 to 50 aircraft for
passenger transportation, 20 to 30 for the offshore oil industry and 10
for corporate use ("Civil Tilt Rotor Studies," June 1990, p. 36). Other
studies are underway in Canada, Puerto Rico, Japan and Europe.
Although the parameters of CTR economic analysis are still a
matter of debate, there appears to be several marketing opportunities for
civilian derivatives of the V-22. The key variable is suitably low unit
costs. A Congressional decision supporting the Marine Corps' acquisition
of the V-22 may result in lower follow on commercial tilt rotor unit
costs. Additionally, V-22 procurement within the Defense Department
provides Bell and Boeing the opportunity to document the aircraft's on
line performance, reliability and operating expenses. This information is
needed, Bell and Boeing contend, to make headway in commercial aviation.
2. EXTERNALITIES
If the V-22 enters military production and unit costs become
attractive to commercial interests, several externalities may follow the
introduction of the Osprey into the market place. Tilt rotor aircraft
could significantly reduce crowding on main runways at major airports and
unload the nearly saturated air traffic control system . Provided initial
CTR operations begin at existing relief airports and helicopter landing
sites, an immediate savings should be realized from reduced runway and
taxi construction. With the development of the "vertiport" concept, the
load on air traffic controllers could be evenly distributed into separate
operations not only reducing costs but improving safety. ("Civil Tiltrotor
Study," June 1990, pp. 68-69)
Other externalities may be tradeoffs. Noise, pollution and
environmental effects may decline at large airports but increase at feeder
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facilities or newly constructed "vertiports" . However, the short field
capabilities of a CTR seem to suggest more positive externalities than
negative ones.
3. FOREIGN COMPETITION AND TRADE
A Japanese trade minister recently said:
If you build the V-22 Osprey, we certainly will buy it. If you
don't build it we will make it and sell it back to you (Harvey, June
1990, p. 34).
It appears that a technological race is underway to build the world's
first hybrid airplane/helicopter. Bell and Boeing, the V-22 manufactures,
have the edge but the slow moving tilt rotor program has awakened world
competition in this aerospace field.
In the summer of 1990, the Ishida Corporation (Japan) broke
ground on a factory in Texas where it intends to produce the TW-68, its
own version of the Osprey. The TW-68 differs from the V-22 in several
ways
:
• Its development is solely for the civil aviation market.
• The TW-68 will have a tilt wing configuration rather than a tilt
engine/rotor structure.
• Metal materials will be used rather than composites.
Unlike the Bell-Boeing V-22, Ishida 's goals are passenger comfort and a
desire to be the low cost producer. Metal cutting should start this year
and fly-off is anticipated for 1992. (Kocks, June 1990, p. 41)
Besides Japan, EUROFAR, q a multinational tilt rotor developer,
is studying the European market for a possible tilt rotor proposal of its
own (Briganti, May 1989, pp. 20-21). It appears that if the Bell-Boeing
team does not start production of the V-22, then other firms in the
4EUROFAR stands for European Future Advanced Rotorcraft. It is a five
nation seven company cooperative venture to investigate the feasibility of
European tilt rotor. The program consists of Europe's four helicopter
manufactures, Aerospatiale, Agusta, Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm and
Westland plus three aircraft manufactures Aeritalia, British Aerospace and
CASA.
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international market place stand to capitalize on the hybrid
helicopter/airplane concept.
Although the Bell-Boeing approach is different than the Ishida
concept, the potential payoffs could be roughly equivalent. As suggested
earlier, a Marine Corps buy of 550 aircraft may make the V-22 commercially
competitive with the TW-68. Without a Department of Defense commitment,




In an economic sense, unemployment associated with a final
decision to cancel the V-22 is a pecuniary cost. 10 Since the V-22 program
will not increase the overall Defense Department expenditures (given the
declining defense budgets projected for the future), no new jobs will be
created within the American economy. In essence, a V-22 production
decision only effects the distribution of jobs in the economy. In purely
economic terms, the pecuniary losses of individuals in one sector of the
economy will be offset by individual gains in another (Mansfield, 1988,
pp. 512-514).
According to economic theory, resources flow from stagnant or
declining areas of the economy to areas which are experiencing growth.
If the Osprey is produced, the project will attract resources from other
sectors of the economy. If the V-22 is canceled, some engineers, machine
operators and managers, will probably seek employment with foreign firms
that are developing their own tilt rotor variants. Others will face the
cold reality of adapting old talents or learning new skills to obtain work
in more promising areas of the economy. Therefore, economic theory
suggests that unemployment should not be a factor in the V-22 production
decision.
10Pecuniary benefits and costs occur when individuals in one sector of
the economy gain at the expense of others in another sector of the economy
without altering the overall welfare of the society.
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Nevertheless, unemployment is a major political rallying point
for Osprey supporters. If a full scale production decision is made,
Boeing estimates that it will need from 3,000 to 4,000 workers at its V-22
assembly plant in Pennsylvania. The United Auto Workers claim that 35,000
jobs in the machine-tool and related trades are closely tied to U.S.
production of the V-22 (Harvey, June 1990, p. 39). With foreign firms in
Japan and Europe already tooling up for their versions of a hybrid
helicopter/airplane, it is doubtful that American firms could catch up and
enter these markets. Other potential losers would include Allison, whose
T406-AD-400 turboshaft engines are on the Osprey, and U.S. avionics
manufactures
.
The scope of the V-22 project is immense. If the V-22 enters
full scale production, approximately 1,000 subcontracts could be awarded
to firms located throughout the United States. According to Bell-Boeing,
the value of the contracts will exceed several billion dollars and result
in thousands of jobs (The Bell-Boeing V-22 Osprey Tilt Rotor Program,
1990, p. 21). With subcontractors in 45 states it is no wonder the V-22
continues to enjoy Congressional support.
5 . THE NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
As recent events in the Persian Gulf demonstrated, the United
States defense industrial base is capable of producing the most advanced
equipment in the world. In both macro and micro economic terms, the firms
composing the defense industrial base represent an important national
asset. But, global competition and reduced tensions with the Soviet Union
are leading to declines within the defense industrial base. If the V-22
is not produced, resources will be reallocated to other areas of the
economy. Though economically efficient, the reallocation process
associated with a V-22 cancellation decision could result in an even
greater downturn in the defense industry. Of course, backlogged or highly
diversified defense contractors could actually benefit from the new supply
of resources made available by discontinuing the V-22 program. However,
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the country's present advantage in tilt rotor technology would be ceded to
Europe or Japan.
Although it is extremely difficult to quantify, national benefits
are derived from a healthy industrial base. A positive V-22 production
decision would help to maintain the base and keep several manufactures in
a position to respond to national emergencies. In the future, a purely
competitive market might not respond rapidly enough to meet defense
emergencies. While an appropriate Osprey production decision would
balance national security benefits gained from a favorable V-22 production
decision against the opportunity costs of employing these resources in
other areas of the economy, a definitive determination is difficult to
establish.
Clearly, V-22 production would simultaneously sustain the
industrial base and provide the Marine Corps with a weapons system well
suited for military actions like those in the Persian Gulf, Panama and
Grenada. On the other hand, V-22 production could prevent resources from
moving into areas of the economy where the United States enjoys a
comparative advantage over foreign producers. In the final analysis,
national security may justify government action to preserve resources for
the defense industrial base while foregoing the comparative advantages
associated with free international trade.
6 . CONTRACTOR RELATIONS
According to Beverly F. Dolan, Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of Bell Textron, Incorporated, former Secretary of the Navy, John
Lehman, indicated that a "tight price" on the development program would
encourage government acceptance of a "proper" profit on the V-22
production run (Schemmer, August 1990, p. 1). Consequently, Bell and
Boeing funded significant portions of Osprey research and development
costs under a fixed price contract. The primary contractors have absorbed
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300 million in tooling costs" and maintained the program's schedule by
injecting team funds to fabricate mockups and perform component testing
(The Bell-Boeing V-22 Osprey Tilt Rotor Aircraft Program, 1990, p. 18).
Final termination of the V-22 would mean financial setbacks for Bell and
Boeing. On future contracts both companies would probably insist on the
government assuming a greater portion of the research and development
costs. The aerospace industry's position is best summed up by Mr. Dolan:
The government talks about being your partner... you are always a
partner going in, but they divorce you in a second and leave industry
hanging on a limb (Schemmer, August 1990, p. 1).
D. LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
In June of 1991, Secretary Cheney told V-22 supporters in Congress
that an understanding could be reached about the Osprey ' s future. Sources
on Capitol Hill indicated that President Bush, who is growing tired of the
bickering surrounding the tilt rotor program, would include V-22 funding
in his FY-93 budget request. Some Congressional staff members suggested
that the President wants to include the V-22 in the budget request so that
higher priority defense programs would not be tapped by Congress to fund
the tilt rotor. (V-22 Program Can Be Accommodated , Cheney Tells
Congressional Backers, August 26, 1991, p.l)
Although the status of a V-22 line item entry in the FY-92 budget was
not addressed, Secretary Cheney's remarks hint that he is becoming more
sensitive to mounting Congressional support behind the tilt rotor
aircraft. Since Congress appeared to be prevailing, further debate would
only increase the price of the V-22. By accommodating Congress, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense can acquire the Osprey at a lower price
than at some mandated time in the future.
Aviation industry officials welcomed the President's move, but
expressed caution. If the FY-93 funds are for production, then the
administration's proposal would be regarded as a very strong signal in
"The contractors are expected to recover tooling costs through
depreciation over the life of the program.
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favor of the V-22. However, a budget request to continue full scale
development and testing would leave the program in the same position as it
is today. (V-22 Program Can Be Accommodated , Cheney Tells Congressional
Backers, August 26, 1991, p. 8)
If Secretary Cheney approves the V-22 for production, the Air Force
and the Army may publicly express their desire for additional Ospreys.
The existing Air Force requirement is for 55 aircraft, but under an
officially supported program that number may rise to more than 100 tilt
rotors. In 1987, the Army withdrew from the V-22 development program.
Yet, at the 1991 Paris Air Show, Army officials publicly suggested that
they wanted to examine tilt rotor technology in an attack role. With its
speed and range advantages over conventional helicopters, studies might
show the V-22 could replace the Army's AH-64 Apache attack helicopter.
However, Army officials later asserted that their statements had been
misinterpreted and that they had stopped short of supporting the V-22.
Nevertheless, they conceded that the V-22 could replace the CH-47, the
Army's main transport helicopter. (V-22 Program Can Be Accommodated,
Cheney Tells Congressional Backers, 1991, p. 8)
More immediate concerns focus on the June 11, 1991 crash of V-22
prototype number five. Immediately following takeoff the aircraft became
unstable in roll. Although pitch control was fine, prototype number five
was dangerously slow to react to roll inputs from the pilot. As lateral
instability increased, the pilot in command started a gradual descent from
15 feet in an attempt to make a vertical landing. But, the left infrared
suppressor hit the ground resulting in further unscheduled role. When the
rotors hit the tarmac, the prototype was doomed. The aircraft rolled
inverted and crashed. (Harvey, August 1991, p. 24)
Sources close to the V-22 indicated that "hardware" caused the
accident. Unofficially, it appears that during the flight control
assembly process terminals in a wiring harness connecting the flight
control computers to actuator motors were improperly connected. However,
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the flight control software could also be the blame. If the post crash
investigation confirms that "hardware" is the problem, Congressional
response is expected to be negligible. But, a software failure may cool
Congressional support for the tilt rotor because contractor credibility
and tilt rotor reliability may be called into guestion. (Harvey, August
1991, pp. 23-26)
Although a multimillion prototype was lost, some positive results have
emerged from the mishap. Enhancing the V-22's survivability claims, the
fuselage broke along predicated paths, the composite structure remained
intact and the nitrogen suppressors in the fuel tanks prevented a
potentially large fire. Conseguently, the pilots were able to egress from
the tilt rotor virtually unharmed. (Harvey, August 1991, pp. 23)
In retrospect, the accident probably occurred at the worst possible
time. Bell and Boeing are still trying to maintain Congressional support
for the V-22 program. But, until the cause of the accident is known, its
influence on Congressional funding remains unknown.
E . SUMMARY
From a public policy point of view, a cost/benefit analysis of the
tilt rotor production decision should encompass all the costs and benefits
to American society, not just those of the Marine Corps or the Department
of Defense. Commercial applications and spin-offs related to tilt-rotor
technology are very real benefits that are relevant to the analysis. But,
they are extremely difficult to address. If private benefits exceed
costs, then the government may not need to fund the tilt rotor project.
The government is only needed if external benefits are significant and
private costs exceed private benefits.
The private sector potential of the V-22 raises several issues about
federally supported technology development programs with real or perceived
commercial applications. In the private sector, commercial technologies
routinely face many alternatives in the market place. To gain widespread
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use, a product must be "technically" and "economically" competitive.
Signals from the market place help decision makers judge uncertainty and
decide whether or not to continue the research and development project.
Producing the tilt rotor solely for its spin off potential may mask these
signals or displace or duplicate private hybrid airplane-helicopter
development efforts. Even if the V-22 is acguired by the United States
Marine Corps, there is no guarantee that the tilt rotor will be
commercially successful. On the other hand, its entirely possible that a
successful hybrid airplane-helicopter could emerge (not necessarily in the
United States) without government acquisition of the V-22. Therefore,
above every other consideration, a V-22 production decision should ensure
that the Osprey efficiently and effectively fulfills Marine Corps
requirements while simultaneously meeting national defense needs. 12
(Gates, 1988, pp. 27-29)
Nevertheless, public policy is determined in a political arena.
Though not assured, a favorable V-22 full scale production decision
appears possible. The War in the Persian Gulf underscored the need for
speed and mobility on the battlefield. Given President Bush's recent
decision to reduce the scope of the Strategic Defense Initiative, the
types of military conflicts the United States has engaged in over the last
four decades, Congressional concerns about spin off tilt rotor technology,
and a legitimate Marine Corps requirement, the political climate seems
right for V-22 production.
Since the tilt rotor has unique rescue, law enforcement, surveillance
and logistics capabilities, the Coast Guard needs to determine whether or
not the Osprey is affordable and functional in the service's aviation
environment. The next chapter begins this assessment by reviewing the
i:Although the Boeing KC-135, nuclear power reactor projects and the
Mercury, Gemini and Apollo space programs produced commercial
applications, all were successful research and development efforts in
their own right.
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IV. COAST GUARD AVIATION REQUIREMENTS
The requirements, which led to the selection of the four basic
airframes now operating in the Coast Guard, are discussed in this chapter.
These requirements establish a foundation for outlining potential tilt
rotor applications specifically for the Coast Guard. At a minimum, a
Coast Guard version of the V-22 would have to be efficient and cost
effective in one of these areas. Alternatively, depending on what
assumptions are made, the V-22 could be an efficient replacement in a
combination of areas or function as a gap filling resource by
incorporating a mixture of these requirements.
This chapter is organized into six sections. The first section
presents a broad overview of Coast Guard aviation's major requirements.
Then, sections two through five address particular aviation resource
requirements in the following order: short range and recovery resource,
medium range and recovery resource, medium range surveillance resource and
long range surveillance resource. The last section offers a brief
synopsis of the chapter.
Historically, the service's search and rescue mission has played a
primary role in defining aviation resource requirements. However, Coast
Guard air assets actually operate in a multi-mission arena that cuts
across several program boundaries. These programs include:
• Search and rescue.
• Enforcement of laws and treaties.
• Marine environmental protection.
• Defense readiness.
• Aids to navigation.
• Ice operations.
• Port safety and security.
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While search and rescue remains a fundamental mission and a basis for
allocating air resources around the country, requirements from other
programs influence the scope of flight operations, drive improvements to
existing resources, generate needs for new equipment and force shifts in
aircraft basing. Although this chapter reviews the original mission need
statements associated with the HH-65A, HH-60J, HU-25A and HC-130H
aircraft, the dynamic nature of the service's aviation environment has
broadened those requirements over time. Therefore, the following sections
include mandated requirements as well as evolutionary requirements on the
assumption that future aircraft candidates, like the V-22, would be
required to meet or exceed existing capabilities.
A. AVIATION REQUIREMENTS OVERVIEW
Two major terms, recovery and surveillance, dominate Coast Guard air
resource requirements. Today, recovery requirements are satisfied by two
helicopters, the HH-65A and the HH-60J. Two fixed wing aircraft, the
HU-25A and the HC-130H meet surveillance needs.
When late l?60's technology offered a long range recovery helicopter
as a viable alternative to the seaplanes then in service, the Coast
Guard's two helicopter system was established {Coast Guard Recovery
Aircraft, A Two Helicopter System, 1986, p. 1-4). Although the Coast
Guard's first amphibious short range and recovery helicopter (the HH-52A
Seaguard) was acquired in 1963, a long range counterpart (the HH-3F
Pelican) was not available until 1969. Three important underlying factors
contributed to the dual helicopter strategy:
• The majority of the Coast Guard's rescue cases occur within 150
nautical miles of shore.
• A long range helicopter was more expensive than a short range
helicopter
.
• Limited small helicopter capabilities and a need to operate in
adverse weather conditions necessitated a mix of long range and short
range rotary wing aircraft.
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As the Coast Guard switched from HH-52A's to HH-65A's and from HH-3F's to
HH-60J's, the two helicopter system remained in place. In essence, it
balanced mission needs with mission costs.
Recognizing the relatively short range, slow speed and limited
navigation capabilities of early helicopters, the Coast Guard also adopted
a dual fixed wing strategy to satisfy its patrol and surveillance
requirements. The HU-25A jet offers rapid medium range response. It is
used to map oil spills, interdict suspicious aircraft, fly law enforcement
patrols (both fisheries and drug interdiction) and perform intermediate
search and rescue missions that are beyond the range of Coast Guard
helicopters (Pumps and rafts can be air dropped from the HU-25A to vessels
in distress)
.
The service's long range requirements are satisfied by the HC-130H.
It operates at great distances from shore while conducting pollution
overflights, law enforcement patrols and search and rescue missions.
Although not possessing the speed of the HU-25A, its endurance and cargo
capacity are unmatched by any other Coast Guard air asset.
B. SHORT RANGE AND RECOVERY MISSION NEEDS
The short range and recovery helicopter prosecutes coastal rescue
cases, deploys on Coast Guard cutters and icebreakers, performs light load
logistics flights and flies relatively short duration patrols. Relevant
requirements, which led to the HH-65A short range and recovery resource,
are outlined below:
• Cruise speeds greater than the existing short range and recovery
helicopter... 90 knots.
• An endurance of 3.0 flight hours.
• An ability to recover three persons from a marine distress situation.
• A radius of action of 150 nautical miles.
• A minimum 1500 pound cargo sling capability.
• Room and adequate power to transport up to five passengers.
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• Full operational capabilities in climatic conditions ranging from
sub-tropic to polar.
• Compatibility with all Coast Guard cutter flight decks... 378 high
endurance class cutters, 270 medium endurance class cutters, 210
medium endurance class cutters and polar class ice breakers.
• Maintainability and reliability characteristics allowing 14 day law
enforcement deployments aboard flight deck equipped Coast Guard
cutters
.
• Night vision goggle compatibility (evolutionary requirement).
• An ability to perform five month deployments aboard Coast Guard
icebreakers. (Acquisition Paper for a Short Range and Recovery
System, 1977, pp. 1-7)
C. MEDIUM RANGE AND RECOVERY MISSION NEEDS
The medium range and recovery helicopter fills the gap between the
short range and recovery helicopter and the medium range surveillance
aircraft. It has greater endurance and can recover heavier loads from
longer distances than the short range helicopter. The essential elements
for the medium range and recovery resource are addressed in the following
list:
• An ability to operate in the search and rescue mission envelope from
151 to 300 nautical miles off shore.
• At the 300 nautical mile search and rescue mission boundary possess
a 45 minute on scene endurance to search, locate, and hoist survivors
of a mishap.
• A capability to rescue survivors from the marine environment.
• An ability to transport at least six non-crew members (i.e.,
passengers, survivors, etc.).
• Compatibility with the flight decks on 270 class medium endurance
cutters and 378 class high endurance cutters (Historically, the Coast
Guard has chosen not to deploy its medium range and recovery
helicopters due to weight and flight deck clearance limitations).
• A capacity to perform support operations for the Navy including full
compatibility with the Navy flight decks and ship helicopter
equipment
.
• Possess an external lift capability up to 8,000 pounds to support
marine environmental protection and aids to navigation missions.
• An arrival time on scene equivalent to or earlier than the current
medium range and recovery helicopter (an HH-3F helicopter with a
cruise speed of 109 knots).
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• Night vision goggle compatibility (evolutionary requirement).
• An ability to safely perform all missions in adverse weather
conditions over land or sea, day or night, in any season in the
service's area of responsibility. "Violent storm" force winds or
"mountainous seas" (Beaufort Scale number 11) should not restrict
medium range and recovery operations. (Medium Range and Recovery
Acquisition Paper Update, 1990, pp. 1-8)
D. MEDIUM RANGE AND SURVEILLANCE MISSION NEEDS
In 1981, the HU-25A replaced both the HU-16E seaplane and the HC-131A
transport to become the Coast Guard's medium range and surveillance
aircraft. The Medium Range Surveillance Aircraft Characteristics Board
determined that the Coast Guard lacked the funding to design and build an
aircraft to meet the service's peculiar needs. The board recommended
acquiring an "off-the-shelf" aircraft that could be adapted to meet Coast
Guard requirements. Those requirements, now embodied in the HU-25A, are
listed below:
• A multi-engine fan jet powered aircraft weighing at least 20,000
pounds
.
• A combined cockpit and interior volume of at least 600 cubic feet.
• An ability to house a full range of flight surveillance electronics
including a cabin sensor display console.
• 15 cubic feet for a forward looking multi-mode radar.
• Storage space of at least 19 cubic feet for rescue equipment
including dewatering pumps, life rafts and radio beacons, plus 15
cubic feet for crew survival equipment. The storage area must be
within a temperature controlled pressurized cabin.
• Accommodations for a crew of five, 225 pounds of aerial delivery
stores, 400 pounds of crew survival equipment and 360 pounds of
additional payload.
• Two scanner stations with viewing windows unobstructed by wings,
exhaust gasses or engines.
• Aerial delivery capability.
• Endurance approaching six hours at or below 2,000 feet.
• An ability to operate continuously between speeds of 150 knots and
normal cruise speed.
• Takeoff and landing performance allowing operations from runways as
short as 5,000 feet.
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• Compatibility with the four primary AIREYE sensors, the AN/ASP-131
side looking airborne radar, the AN/ASQ-174 active television night
vision sensor, RS-18C infrared/ultraviolet line scanner, and the KS-
87B camera incorporated in the HU-25B avionics package or an
equivalent capability (evolutionary requirement).
• Equivalent capacity or capability to use the three primary air
intercept sensors, the AN/APG-66 radar, the LTN-72 inertial
navigation system and the WF-360 forward looking infrared equipment,
aboard the HU-25C (evolutionary requirement).
• Availability for 1,000 flight hours per aircraft per year. (Medium
Range Surveillance Aircraft Characteristics Board Report, 1974 pp.
1-9)
E. LONG RANGE AND SURVEILLANCE MISSION NEEDS
Since the early 1960's, C-130 type aircraft have met the Coast Guard's
long range patrol and search needs. Periodically, newer versions of the
C-130 have been procured, but its position as the service's long range air
resource has never been seriously challenged. The following parameters
define the HC-130H's role in Coast Guard aviation operations:
• Ability to proceed expeditiously to the scene of distress in order to
minimize people's exposure to life threatening situations.
• Capability to search open ocean areas (generally more than 300
nautical miles offshore)
.
• Travel at least 300 nautical miles offshore and still possess an on
scene endurance exceeding four hours.
• Provide transportation and the command and control equipment for an
on scene commander to control numerous search vehicles in isolated
offshore environments.
• Serve as a communications platform or relay station in remote
offshore areas.
• Possess the ability to transport pollution response teams and their
heavy equipment from staging bases in the United States to locations
at or near pollution incidents anywhere in the world.
• Act as the primary means of logistic support for Coast Guard LORAN
and OMEGA long range aids to navigation stations at various locations
in the North Atlantic and North Pacific.
• Provide long range aerial surveillance of fishing fleets in the
waters off Alaska, Hawaii and the western Pacific to enforce fishing
treaties
.
• Act as a long range platform to detect and interrupt the flow of
contraband by surveying and identifying vessels in the Caribbean Sea
and Gulf of Mexico as well as those operating far off the eastern and
western seaboards of the United States.
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• Support the International Ice Patrol by conducting surveillance
flights for icebergs over the ocean waters east of Newfoundland.
• Possess the capability to deliver rescue equipment while airborne.
• Have the ability to carry passengers, equipment and large volume
cargo to remote areas of the world. (Peterson, telephone
conversation, November 1, 1991)
F. SYNOPSIS
Again, this chapter outlines the service's existing aviation
requirements. These requirements encompass two broad operating domains,
recovery and surveillance, and four major aircraft types. While public
demands, technology and the existing Coast Guard budget have contributed
to the four air asset strategy, the service should not remain blindly
committed to this plan or the resources currently in place. Depending on
the marginal benefits and marginal costs, the V-22 could be a reasonable
substitute for one or more of the existing aircraft. The unique
capabilities of the tilt rotor could also give rise to marginal benefits
that would encourage its addition to the fleet. On the other hand, costs
could exclude it from consideration all together.
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V. SEARCH AND RESCUE INFORMATION
In broad terms, this chapter highlights information contained in the
National Search and Rescue (SAR) Data Base. The purpose of the chapter is
twofold. First, to outline historic rescue response levels and to profile
the general location of offshore search and rescue activities within the
maritime SAR region. Second, to lay the ground work for ensuing portions
of the thesis that discuss potential assimilation strategies for the V-22.
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section presents
general search and rescue case information; the second focuses on rescue
efforts made by Coast Guard aviation resources.
A. GENERAL INFORMATION
Appendix C, which covers fiscal years 1986 through 1990, categorizes
the number of service-wide search and rescue cases, lives saved and
persons assisted by distance offshore. An annual service wide average,
derived from the data in Appendix C, is presented in Table 1. It shows
that from fiscal year 1986 through fiscal year 1990, over 99% of the Coast
Guard's rescue cases occurred within 150 nautical miles of the coast. As
a matter of fact, Figure 1 reveals that over 98% of the Coast Guard's
fiscal year 1989 search and rescue cases took place within 50 nautical
miles of shore (1989 SAR Statistics, 1990, p. 27)."
Nevertheless, some interesting observations can be made about the
service's long distance rescue efforts. While the 151 to 300 nautical
mile envelope accounts for only 0.3% of all search and rescue cases,
sorties within this region account for 2.0% of the total number of lives
saved. Although mission activity in the 151 to 300 nautical mile range is
relatively light, a life is saved on an average of every other case.
3There were 52,346 search and rescue cases in fiscal year 1989
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TABLE 1 FIVE YEAR AVERAGE ANNUAL SERVICE WIDE OFFSHORE SAR SUMMARY
DISTANCE OFFSHORE (NM)
CATEGORY 0-150 151-300 300 + TOTAL
NUMBER OF CASES 54,412 191 208 54,811
% OF TOTAL CASES 99.3 0.3 0.4 100
LIVES SAVED 4,855 101 132 5,088
% OF TOTAL LIVES SAVED 95.4 2.0 2.6 100
LIVES SAVED PER CASE .089 .529 .635 .092
PERSONS ASSISTED 124,886 419 657 125,962
% OF TOTAL PERSONS
ASSISTED
99.2 0.3 0.5 100




















Averages for the greater than 300 nautical miles offshore category are
similar to those associated with the 151 to 300 nautical mile offshore
envelope. This envelope accounts for 0.4% of the total number of search
and rescue cases; however, the rescue operations in this region account
for 2.6% of the total number of lives saved. Again, the rescue activity
in this region is light, but a life is saved on average more than half the
time.
At ranges exceeding 150 nautical miles offshore, case frequency is
relatively low. The vast majority of the life saving cases happened
within 150 nautical mile of shore. But, Table 1 seems to suggest that
cases more than 150 nautical miles offshore usually involve life saving
sorties. Although search and rescue mission urgency is not always related
to distance offshore, one could reasonably infer that rescue cases more
than 150 nautical miles from shore often require life critical responses.
Therefore, increased resource speed, especially in areas greater than 150
nautical miles offshore, could conceivably save more lives.
If the Coast Guard becomes interested in adding another resource to
its current mix of rescue platforms, it needs to examine the number of
failed rescue cases rather than the successful ones. The primary question
becomes whether or not the new resource could have made a difference to
the outcome of a case. If the answer to that question is yes, then
marginal benefits could be evaluated against marginal costs.
Another alternative involves examining the efficiency of current
resources. If it can be shown that the new resource is more efficient
than an existing resource or mix of resources then marginal costs could
again be evaluated against marginal benefits.
Unfortunately, standard data retrieval procedures from the National
Search and Rescue Date Base give only the number of lives lost before or
after Coast Guard notification of a distress situation. A manual
screening of case records is required to subjectively determine whether or
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not the V-22 could have changed the outcome in any particular instance.
Such a screening is beyond the scope of this thesis.
B. AVIATION SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS
Figure 2 presents the percentage of aviation cases as a function of
distance offshore 14 . While over 98% of the service's 1989 cases were
within 50 nautical miles of shore, 93% of aviation's responses occurred
within 50 nautical miles of the coast. Correspondingly, 7% of aviation's
1989 responses were more than 50 nautical miles offshore compared to 1.7
percent for the service at large. From 1986 to 1990 only 0.7% of the
service's total number of rescue cases took place outside 150 nautical
miles. But, 2% of aviation's 1989 responses reguired sorties beyond that
distance. (Holden, personal interview, September 6, 1991)
Although further statistical validation is necessary, it seems that
Coast Guard aircraft tend to perform a high percentage of the
service's long range rescue cases. This is an environment where speed
could be the difference between life and death.
Figure 3 shows that in fiscal year 1989 Coast Guard aircraft performed
9.8% of the service's search and rescue responses (1989 SAR Statistics,
1990, p. 24). ,s Appendix D depicts the number of cases, sorties, total
time on sorties, lives saved, lives lost after notification, persons
assisted and property value assisted by the service's aviation assets. As
expected, the short range and recovery helicopter, the HH-65A, has the
heaviest case load. Yet, each aircraft type contributes to the Coast
Guard's overall search and rescue effort.
However, Appendix D indicates that lives are sometimes lost after
Coast Guard aviation resources receive notification of a distress
l4There were 6,130 search and rescue cases in fiscal year 1989 that
involved aviation resources.
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Figure 2 Aviation Cases By Distance Offshore
situation.' 6 But, without reviewing individual case records, it is
difficult to determine whether or not the V-22 could have changed the
outcome of any particular case.
Invariably, one could argue that rescue activity is so light outside
300 nautical miles that the case load does not warrant the Osprey ' s 600
nautical mile radius of action. While this argument has some merit, the
data is somewhat biased against the tilt rotor. Two thoughts come to
mind:
• Range limitations prevent current recovery resources from flying
farther than 300 nautical miles out to sea; therefore, one would
expect correspondingly lower activity levels at distances greater
than 300 nautical miles from shore.
l6In multi-unit cases, "lives saved" and "lives lost" are credited to














Figure 3 Coast Guard Response Profile
• Although rescue sites can be located close to shore, aircraft may
still have to fly long distances to perform searches or even to
transit directly to the scene.
Nevertheless, a cursory examination of the search and rescue data does not
appear to suggest an operational breakdown that immediately demands the
tilt rotor.
As far as the search and rescue program is concerned, two economic
issues are important. First, does the cost of lives lost and property
lost in situations where the V-22 could have changed the outcome justify
the added expenses associated with acquiring and operating the tilt rotor
system? If the answer to that question is no, then benefits to other
program areas must be considered. If after reviewing other program areas
the answer is still no, then the current mix of aircraft is sufficient.
The second issue revolves around V-22 capabilities. Is it more
efficient and/or more effective in the search and rescue environment than
46
an aircraft or combination of aircraft already in operation? Again, if
the answer is no, contributions to other program areas must be evaluated.
If after further review the answer remains no, the existing aircraft mix
is satisfactory. Even if the V-22 is more efficient and/or more effective
than a current aircraft or combination of aircraft, a favorable
acquisition decision depends on those benefits exceeding the costs of
acquiring and operating the tilt rotor system.
While every life is precious, the benefits of any lifesaving program
should be evaluated in terms of the opportunity costs associated with that
effort (Rhodes, 1990, p. 20). In this case, other measures, such as
public safety education, the increasing availability of marine band
radios, improved electronic navigational aids and/or additional motor
lifeboats could prove just as effective at reducing the number of lives
lost as the V-22. In addition, these efforts could be less expensive than
the tilt rotor.
Although the chapter is not based on a rigorous statistical proof,
potential search and rescue mission improvements offered by the V-22 will
probably not go unquestioned. However, public opinion could turn out to
be a powerful force supporting a Coast Guard version of the V-22. Why
should tilt rotor capabilities be reserved solely for the military? Once
a Department of Defense tilt rotor performs a military rescue 500 nautical
miles offshore, fisherman and pleasure boaters would undoubtedly expect
the same service (Goward, 1990, pp. 83-85).
Nonetheless, benefits outside the search and rescue arena could be
important factors that determine whether or not the Coast Guard should
acquire the V-22. Therefore, the next chapter compares tilt rotor
performance characteristics and projected costs to those of existing air
assets with an eye toward assimilating how the V-22 could be put into
Coast Guard service.
47
VI. COMPARING THE V-22 WITH EXISTING COAST GUARD AIRCRAFT
Comparing four different types of post production 17 aircraft with a
prototype tilt rotor is an extremely challenging task. In some cases
available research time and the necessity to investigate non computerized
archived cost data limited the scope and thoroughness of the study. In
other cases diverse forms of cost and performance information combined
with the inherent differences associated with each aircraft design made
valid forms of comparison difficult to establish. Nevertheless, this
chapter highlights some of the strengths and weaknesses associated with
each aircraft type. Aircraft characteristics, cost data and fleet wide
comparisons are evaluated in the chapter.
A. AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS
This section compares the V-22's projected aircraft characteristics
with the four major aircraft types now in service. Each characteristic is
summarized in Table 2 and discussed in the following paragraphs. It is
important to note that Table 2 contains average values and that actual
aircraft performance will vary with altitude, gross weight, temperature,
pressure, wind and airspeed. Each aircraft also offers tradeoffs that
sacrifice one attribute to enhance another. For example, fuel load can be
decreased to increase cargo payload (within center of gravity, deck
loading and volume limits) or maximum range airspeed can be foregone in
favor of maximum endurance airspeed or maximum cruise airspeed.
1. CRUISE AIRSPEED
Although not as fast as the HU-25A, the speed of the V-22 is
comparable to that of the HC-130H. The HU-25A*s 160 knot speed advantage
is significant. It enables the HU-25A to intercept civilian aircraft that
l7The C-130 and H-60 are still in production. Only the civil aviation
versions of the HU-25A and HH-65A are in production (the Falcon 20
business jet and the Dolphin III helicopter respectively).
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TABLE 2 AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS
CHARACTERISTIC 1 HH-65A HH-60J HU-25A HC-130H V-22
Cruise Speed
(KTAS) 125 125 410 290 250
Max Gross Weight 51,700
(lbs) 8900 21,884 32,000 155,000 to
60,400
Fuel Capacity 13,700
(lbs) 19,000 6460 10,000 62,920 to
29,300
Fuel Consumption
(lbs/hr) 611 1001 2015 5600 2600
Maximum Endurance
(hrs + min) 3 + 00 6 + 00 5 + 45 14 + 00
5+00 to
8+30
Maximum Range (NM) 350 700 1940 4500 1150 to2100
Radius of Action
(NM) 150
: 300 800 1600 575 to1050
Cargo Payload




Load (lbs) 2000 6000 N/A N/A
15,000 3
Rescue Hoist





Coast Guard aircraft characteristics were provided
by the service's Office of Aviation Plans and
Programs. V-22 information was provided by Mr.
James Magee, Program Manager for V-22 Variants,
Bell-Boeing Joint Program Office.
125 nautical miles with a rescue swimmer aboard.
Double sling required. 10,000 lbs with single
sling
.
attempt to enter the country illegally (i.e., drug traffickers) and it
provides quick response for medium range search and rescue. Although the
V-22 could be used to intercept some civilian aircraft, intercept closure
rates would be much slower than those achieved with the HU-25A.
Yet, the V-22 has one advantage over the HU-25A. The Osprey can
make recoveries while the HU-25A cannot. Even though the HU-25A can air
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drop pumps and rafts, there are certain rescue missions that absolutely
require recoveries (i.e., medical evacuations, people in the water, etc.).
While the HU-25A's faster speed conceivably reduces detection time, a
helicopter or surface resource is often needed to complete the case. In
short, the HU-25A is faster, but the V-22 lessens the need for two
resources
.
When compared with Coast Guard helicopters, the speed advantage
rests with the V-22. It is twice as fast, a significant benefit for most
mission scenarios.
2. MAXIMUM GROSS WEIGHT
By Coast Guard standards, the tilt rotor is a fairly heavy
aircraft. Only the HC-130H is heavier. Under no wind conditions, the V-22
can accomplish vertical takeoff and landings up to a gross weight of
51,700 pounds. Bell and Boeing recommend a maximum gross weight of 60,400
pounds for short field takeoff s and landings. 18
The V-22 ' s size and weight prevent it from taking off or landing
on Coast Guard cutters (a requirement for the short range and recovery
helicopter and a desirable feature for the medium range and recovery
helicopter). Although a ship to aircraft in flight refueling system, much
like current HIFR 19 systems could possibly be incorporated in the V-22
design, the Osprey's inability to recover aboard Coast Guard cutters
complicates matters. In order to guard against an equipment failure,
prudent action would dictate that routine refueling operations begin while
the V-22 possesses sufficient fuel to reach a shore side refueling site.
Given the relatively long range of the V-22, a ship to aircraft refueling
system might not be practical for Coast Guard operations.
The weight of the V-22 also suggests that sensor packages aboard
present HU-25 models could probably be incorporated into a tilt rotor
l8Straight and level flight with one engine inoperative cannot be
maintained at gross weights above 60,400 pounds.
19Helicopter in flight refueling
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especially configured for the Coast Guard. Additionally, the V-22
should be able to carry more rescue equipment than the HH-65A, HH-60J and
the HU-25A.
3 . FUEL CAPACITY
In general, fuel capacity increases with aircraft weight and
radius of action requirements. When considered with fuel consumption, it
offers insight into aircraft range and endurance. The V-22 provides
several choices. With internal sponson and wing tanks topped off, the
Navy's combat search and rescue version of the Osprey is capable of
carrying 13,700 pounds of fuel. By installing anywhere from one to four
internal cabin auxiliary fuel tanks, fuel capacity can be increased to
29,300 pounds (Each tank weighs 415 pounds and holds approximately 4,000
pounds of fuel). 20
4. FUEL CONSUMPTION
The V-22's fuel consumption is three times that of the HH-65A,
more than twice that of the HH-60J, more than 500 pounds per hour greater
than the HU-25A and much less than HC-130H. However, the V-22's speed
advantage over the HH-60J makes it more competitive than one might think.
Although the V-22 consumes 2,600 pounds of fuel per hour, compared to the
1001 pounds per hour consumed by the HH-60J, the V-22 ' s faster speed
allows it to complete missions in less time than the helicopter. For
example, on a 300 nautical mile radius of action mission, the HH-60J will
take 4.8 hours to fly 600 nautical miles and burn 4,805 pounds of fuel.
The V-22 completes the same mission in 2.4 hours and uses 6,240 pounds of
fuel, while accumulating less wear and tear on the airframe.
Of course, a similar situation exists between the HU-25A and the
V-22. In this case, the Falcon uses less fuel than the Osprey. The HU-
25A will fly a 1200 nautical mile sortie in 2.9 hours and consume 5,844
•"With all four auxiliary tanks installed cabin capacity is reduced.
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pounds of fuel. A tilt rotor would take 4.8 hours to perform the same
mission and consume 12,480 pounds of fuel in the process.
Fuel consumption also depends on mission profile. Generally, jet
engines are more efficient at higher rather than lower altitudes. For
example, no matter what the gross weight, a HC-130H on a low level patrol
(500 feet above sea level) consumes approximately 6,000 pounds of fuel per
hour. At cruise altitudes (20,000 feet mean sea level), the HC-130H burns
anywhere from 4,000 pounds of fuel per hour to 6,000 pounds per hour
depending on aircraft weight. A similar effect is present in the V-22.
At a gross weight of 50,000 pounds the V-22 consumes 2,650 pounds of fuel
per hour at sea level, 2,550 pounds per hour at 10,000 feet and 2,850
pounds per hour at 20,000 feet.
5. MAXIMUM ENDURANCE
Maximum endurance is a function of aircraft design, fuel load,
pressure altitude, and airspeed. It is achieved by carrying a maximum
fuel load and by consciously flying at the aircraft's maximum endurance
airspeed. :i Additionally, endurance tends to vary indirectly with cargo
payload. As cargo payload increases, fuel load decreases.
Generally, the V-22 offers the same endurance as the HU-25A. The
Falcon can remain airborne for 5.75 hours verses 5 to 9.0 hours for the
Osprey. If internal cabin tanks are installed in the Osprey, the tilt
rotor exceeds the endurance of all Coast Guard aircraft except the HC-
130H. But, maximum endurance does not equate to maximum flyable distance.
Maximum distance is achieved by operating at the aircraft's maximum range
airspeed for the atmospheric conditions present during the flight. 22
In a practical sense, endurance determines how long an aircraft
can be employed before it must be refueled. But, each operational mission
is unique. Urgency, mission, range to scene, search target, weather and
2lVaries with aircraft weight and altitude.
"Varies with weight, altitude and wind direction. Approximately,
4/3' s faster than maximum endurance airspeed.
52
other variables influence a pilot's airspeed selection. Sometimes speed
is more important than endurance (i.e., rescuing a person in the water).
When an on scene presence is desired, endurance is more important than
speed (i.e., maintaining covert contact with a suspect vessel). More
often than not, missions require a combination of speeds.
Depending on which tilt rotor auxiliary fuel tank configuration
is selected, the V-22 can stay aloft from 5 to 8.5 hours. These times
compare favorably with the HH-60J and the HU-25A. However, in the same
time period the V-22 will fly much farther than the HH-60J. While the
Osprey is slower than the Falcon, its longer endurance would enable it fly
approximately the same distances as the HU-25A.
6. MAXIMUM RANGE
Maximum range is a function of aircraft design, fuel load,
pressure altitude, wind and airspeed. It too tends to vary indirectly
with payload. Maximum range defines the longest distance an aircraft can
fly before it must be refueled. 23 Depending on the number of auxiliary
fuel tanks in use, the V-22's maximum range exceeds that of the HH-60J by
a minimum of 450 nautical miles. With all auxiliary internal tanks
installed, it has twice the range of the HH-60J. But, without internal
fuel tanks, the V-22 falls short of the HU-25A. However, all four
auxiliary cabin fuel tanks allow the Osprey to beat the Falcon.
7. RADIUS OF ACTION
Radius of action represents the maximum distance an aircraft can
fly from a refueling site and return to the same place. Again, the V-22
fairs well against existing Coast Guard resources, especially the
conventional helicopters. While the HH-65A and HH-60J are limited to 150
nautical miles and 300 nautical mile offshore respectively, the V-22 can
operate out to 600 nautical miles offshore. With cabin auxiliary fuel
"^Historically , Coast Guard air assets have not been equipped for
aircraft to aircraft in flight refueling.
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tanks installed, the V-22's radius of action would be even farther;
however, internal cargo capacity would be reduced.
8. CARGO PAYLOAD WITH NORMAL CREW AND MAXIMUM FUEL
It is extremely difficult to establish a representative value for
cargo payload. Generally, fuel can be decreased to increase payload
capacity. In a ridiculous sense, maximum payload is achieved with no fuel
aboard the aircraft. Since Coast Guard aviation missions often involve
surveillance, a measure was selected that provided insight into both cargo
capacity and range or endurance.
In terms of cargo payload, the V-22 offers a wider range of
options than every aircraft except the HC-130H. Provided auxiliary fuel
tanks are not installed, a vertical takeoff and landing can be
accomplished with a full fuel load and a cargo payload up to 2,255 pounds
(see Appendix E). If a short field takeoff option is available, a fully
fueled V-22 without auxiliary fuel tanks can carry up to 10,800 pounds of
cargo. If fuel load is reduced, the V-22 can carry 15,000 pounds of cargo
over 300 nautical miles.
Among Coast Guard aircraft, only the HC-130H can internally lift
more weight than the V-22. Although the V-22 is versatile, it cannot
match the cargo capacity of the HC-130H. The HC-130H can carry 43,000
pounds of cargo 2,000 nautical miles or 20,000 pounds of cargo 3,800
nautical miles or 5,000 pounds of cargo 4,500 nautical miles.
Two other cargo related features of the V-22 are worth noting.
It has a 858 cubic foot cargo hold and a rear cargo door to facilitate
payload handling (more than enough room to meet the medium range and
surveillance resource requirement). As a means of comparison, Coast Guard
operators are already somewhat concerned about HH-60J volume limitations.
Although the HH-60J has reasonable internal payload capacity, the cargo
area is limited to less than 234.8 cubic feet (Angert, telephone
conversation, November 15, 1991).
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9.
EXTERNAL CARGO HOOK LIMIT
The Osprey ' s external cargo hook surpasses the capabilities of
current Coast Guard helicopters. However, the extra capability may not be
necessary for Coast Guard operations. While the service used its HH-52A
and HH-3F to perform external sling work, their volume capacities often
permitted cargo to be carried internally. While there are concerns about
cargo volume capacity in the HH-60J (with this helicopter pilots may have
to think more in terms of external loads rather than internal cargo
capacity), there appears to be sufficient room inside the V-22. The
Osprey 's external load capability would be a desirable feature rather than
an essential one.
10. VERSATILITY
Although versatility is not explicitly expressed in any of the
preceding sub-sections, the comparison of aircraft characteristics
suggests that the tilt rotor is an extremely flexible platform. The V-22
nearly matches the speed of the HC-130H, but falls short of the HC-130H's
internal lift capabilities. While the V-22 lacks the pure speed of the
HU-25A, it could still accomplish most medium range surveillance resource
missions. Electronic detection aids aside, the HU-25A performs its low
level work (searches, pump drops, etc.) at 150 knots. In contrast, the
V-22 can slow to optimum search speeds during encounters with poor
visibility , 24 Finally, unlike the HU-25A, the Osprey can make recoveries.
While differing tremendously in size, the V-22 appears to
outclass both helicopters. Its combination of speed, hover ability and
cargo bearing capacity make it a unique package containing several
desirable features for the Coast Guard (for a graphic comparison of some
aircraft characteristics see Appendix F).
-4Optimum search speed is a function of target size, visibility, sea
state and aircraft altitude.
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B. COST CATEGORIES
Available cost data prevented a complete life cycle cost analysis for
each aircraft. However, interesting cost comparisons are presented in the
following sub-sections of the thesis.
1. UNIT ACQUISITION COST
Acquisition cost includes the airframe, mounted engines,
installed avionics, other hardware, non recurring expenditures test and
demonstration, and in the case of the V-22, research and development.
Table 3 shows the cost of each aircraft in then year dollars and compares
the cost of each aircraft in 1990 dollars (GNP deflator used)
.







HH-65A HH-60J HU-25A HC-130H V-22
$3,500,000 $11,722,000 $4,996,000 $23,000,000 $30,000,000
($ 1984) ($ 1990) ($ 1981) ($ 1989) ($ 1986) 1
$4,325,400 $11,722,000 $7,074,124 $24,569,021 $34,691,573 2
Unit Acquisition Costs includes airframe, mounted engines, installed avionics, test and
demonstrative.
Sources:
HH-65. HU-25. HC-130: Commandant, USCG (G-OAV)
HH-60J: Commandant. USCG (G-AMR)
V-22: Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Program Selected Acquisition Report dated 12-
31-88.
2.
Other weapons systems costs, military construction costs, and initial spares were excluded
from unit cost for comparison with Coast Guard aircraft. Cost escalation information
provided in the SAR was included in unit cost. When weapons system costs, military
construction, and initial spares are considered, unit cost approaches $39,000,000.
Given sufficient orders, Bell-Boeing marketing material indicates that unit costs could
approach $16,000,000. If weapon system and construction costs parallel DOD, unit cost
could approach $45,000,000.
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Although the acquisition price represents only a small portion
of life cycle costs, the V-22 calls for a substantial up front outlay of
at least $34 million. However, Table 3 probably understates the
acquisition costs associated with the HH-65A and the HU-25A. Both
aircraft continue to experience engine, supply and maintainability
problems that increase costs. 25 Nor does Table 3 reflect airframe
upgrades made over time. Lastly, HH-65A and the HU-25A configurations
differ significantly from their civilian counterparts; therefore, costs
associated with reopening production lines would probably result in higher
acquisition prices than those reflected in Table 3.
Yet, the economic reality of sunk, costs likely favors the
existing air assets. If current aircraft remain in production, and the
Coast Guard considers replacements in kind, the existing support base
(spare parts, tools, test equipment, ground service equipment, etc.) would
probably represent a significant advantage for aircraft already in the
field.
A concept related to marginal costing applies as well. If the
V-22 is considered as a replacement for current aircraft, acquisition cost
would be a marginal concern for the tilt rotor, but unless additional
purchases are planned, it would be an irrelevant cost factor for the
existing air assets (investment in the existing resources has already
taken place; consequently, acquisition cost would not be a marginal cost).
The V-22 is not an airplane or a helicopter. Therefore, familiar
measures may not adequately address its costs or potential. However,
managers must sometimes compare dissimilar objects. In fairness to the
V-22, the unit acquisition cost reflects several design features not found
in current Coast Guard airframes. Some of these attributes include:
-
sThe ATF-3 engine on the HU-25A has not been a commercial success.
Compressor, hot section, bearing and turbine problems with the HH-65A's
LTS-101 engine caused the Coast Guard to consider completely re-engining
the aircraft.
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An airframe fabricated almost entirely of composite materials. Only
1,000 pounds of metal are used.
An automatic blade folding and wing stowing system. The V-22 is the
first aircraft whose wings can be rotated parallel to the fuselage
for compact storage.
The first fixed wing aircraft to use "cross-connected" propulsion
systems that ensure balanced thrust with one engine inoperative.
Digital fly-by-wire control system.
Digital flight management system.
A single airframe with the capability to carry a 15,000 pound payload
externally or a 10,000 pound payload internally.
Ballistic tolerance.
A completely hands off forward looking infrared (FLIR) sensor that
responds to the pilot's head and projects the FLIR image on the
pilot ' s visor.
An on board inert gas generating system (OBIGGS) which replaces spent
fuel with nitrogen to purge explosive fumes and improve crash
survivability (Thornborough, 1990, p. 25).
Built-in diagnostic systems with self test capabilities.
Longer intervals between airframe overhauls (The Case for the V-22
Osprey Program, 1990, p. 8).
A vertical takeoff and landing capability combined with the forward
speed of a turboprop airplane.
A terrain storage system with a multi-mode terrain radar
(Thornborough, 1990, p. 18-23).
An AN/ALE-39 missile warning set with chaff, flair and decoy
dispensers (Thornborough, 1990, p. 25).
Fire detection/halon filled suppressor units in the wing to increase
crash survivability and reduce the effectiveness of 30mm ammunition.
(The Bell-Boeing V-22 Osprey Tilt Rotor Aircraft Program, 1990, pp.
1-30)
2. INITIAL PROVISIONING
Initial provisioning consists of both spare parts and repair
parts used for maintenance and replacement purposes. Table 4 compares V-
22 provisioning costs with those of the HH-60J (extensive archive research
beyond the scope of the thesis would be necessary to determine the initial
provisioning costs of the HH-65A, the HH-60J and the HC-130H) . In this
case, the V-22's initial provisioning costs appear to be slightly less
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than those associated with the HH-60J. But, expenditures on the HH-60J
are sunk costs. Therefore, provisioning cost advantages alone probably do
not justify V-22 procurement.




HH-65A HH-60J HU-25A HC-130H V-22





HH-60J: Budget Plans for the HH-60J.
V-22: Selected Acquisition Report, 12-31-f
1. Due to warranty programs, changes in contractor
recommended spares list, and LTS 101 engine
performance disputes, additional archive research is
required to determine cost of initial provisioning.
2. Due to warranty programs, changes in contractor
recommended spares list, and ATF3 engine
contracting, additional archive research is required
to determine cost of initial provisioning.
3. Due to procurement of 1500 series in 1972, 1600
series in 1978, and 1700 series aircraft in 1989,
additional archive research is required to determine
cost of initial provisioning.
3 . ANNUAL PROGRAM FLIGHT HOURS
Table 5 displays annual program flight hours, funded allowance,
fleet wide program hours and fleet size. As the table indicates, the
number of program flight hours vary by aircraft type. The table
represents the annual flying time scheduled for each operational Coast
Guard air resource. Once established, an aircraft type's program flight
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hours usually remain fairly constant during the resource's service life. 2*
In essence, program flight hours define on an individual airframe basis
the amount of flying time available for training and operational missions.
For example, a Coast Guard air station consisting of three HH-65A
helicopters would plan a total of 1,935 flight hours for the entire year.








HH-65A HH-60J HU-25A HC-130H
645 700 800 800
80 32' 32 26
49,855 : 22,400 25,600 20,400 3




The Coast Guard is replacing HH-3F's with HH-60J's.
This number represents the eventual fleet size.
HH-65A:
74 funded at 645 flight hours per year
4 funded at 325 flight hours per year
3 funded at 275 flight hours per year
HC-130H:
25 funded at 800 flight hours per year
1 funded at 400 flight hours per year
The funded allowance refers to the number of Coast Guard aircraft
operating in the field. The funded allowance differs from overall fleet
size because aircraft are periodically withdrawn from service and
overhauled at depot level maintenance facilities.
When program hours for a particular aircraft type are multiplied
by the funded allowance, the total number of fleet wide program flight
:6From time to time adjustments are made to account for changes in
mission demands, aircraft age, reliability or logistics support.
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hours can be determined. This figure represents the total number of
flight hours a particular fleet will accumulate in any particular fiscal
year. Fleet wide program hours embody the total number of flight hours
available to perform training and to fly operational missions on a fleet
wide basis.
Fleet size accounts for the total number of aircraft in the
service's inventory. It represents the total sum of all Coast Guard air
assets of a particular type including aircraft assigned to field units,
those in overhaul and attrition spares.
For the sake of comparison, the Marine Corps is planning to
operate each of their V-22's for 35 hours per month (Thombs, telephone
conversation, October 25, 1991). Although the Marine Corps and Coast
Guard flying environments are different, the Marine Corps' plan calls for
each V-22 to fly 420 hours per year. However, all the Coast Guard's
current aircraft operate at a higher program rate than 420 flight hours
per year. Depending on which resource the V-22 replaces, mission demand
levels might require a Coast Guard version of the tilt rotor to operate at
program levels approaching 800 flight hours per year.
Finally, program flight hours are important because they help
establish Coast Guard aviation's operating and budgeting baseline. In
terms of hypothetically formulating a V-22 fleet size for the Coast Guard,
the concept of program flight hours becomes a key assumption in
determining the number of tilt rotor aircraft necessary to replace an
existing resource.
4 . ANNUAL FIELD LEVEL MAINTENANCE COSTS PER AIRFRAME
Marine Corps estimates regarding V-22 field level maintenance
costs are being reviewed, thus they are not currently available (Thombs,
telephone conversation, October 24, 1991). Table 6 contains field level
maintenance costs for the current fleet of Coast Guard aircraft. If the
V-22 enters production and becomes a viable alternative for the Coast
Guard, tilt rotor field level maintenance costs would be evaluated against
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the field level maintenance costs of existing Coast Guard resources.
Although these costs will increase with inflation and probably rise as
existing resources age, Table 6 provides a near term measuring stick for
the V-22.
















Source: Commandant USCG (G-OAV)
.
Computed by multiplying hourly budget rate and
program flight hours.
Bell and Boeing claim that the V-22 is two times more
maintainable than CH-46 or H-3 generation helicopters (Magee, telephone
conversation, October 25, 1991). But, the Coast Guard's current aircraft
are a generation younger than the CH-46 or the H-3. Since the V-22
incorporates newer technology than the current assets, the tilt rotor may
offer a maintenance advantage over current air assets. But, the savings
would probably be less than that projected for the Marine Corps. 27
Although various estimating techniques can be used to predict V-22 field
level maintenance costs, a high degree of certainty may not be available
until the V-22 actually enters service with a Department of Defense
component
.
:7According to the Institute for Defense Analysis, a highly respected
Washington D.C. think tank, the V-22 is 1.3 to 2.2 times more cost
effective for Marine Corps operations than a mix of UH-60 and CH-53
helicopters (Flight International, July 3. 1990, p. 16).
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5 . ANNUAL DEPOT LEVEL MAINTENANCE COSTS PER AIRFRAME
Marine Corps estimates regarding V-22 depot level maintenance
costs were under review and thus not available (Thombs, telephone
conversation, October 24, 1991). Table 7 outlines depot level maintenance
costs for existing aircraft types in Coast Guard service. Again, these
figures represent bench mark targets that would be compared with V-22
depot level maintenance costs.








HH-65A HH-60J HU-25A HC-130H
$1,039.35 $954.00 $1236.15 $994.25





Source: Commandant, USCG (G-OAV).
Computed by multiplying hourly budget rate and
program flight hours
Bell and Boeing claim that the interval between fixed overhauls
for the all composite V-22 airframe is much greater than the period for
conventional aluminum aircraft (The Case for the V-22 Osprey Program,
1990, p. 8). Although the need for overhauls is not completely
eliminated, this requirement is significantly reduced. It represents a
major marginal benefit over existing Coast Guard air assets.
6 . SUPPORTAB IL ITY
The V-22 is includes several features that enhance supportability
and reliability. Some are listed below:
63
• An all composite airframe designed to resist corrosion in a salt
water operating environment. 28
• Solid state digital avionics and four multi-function color display
tubes in the cockpit.
• Engines incorporating 39 easy to change field replaceable units.
• A diagnostic engine monitoring system.
With the recent exceptions of the HH-65A and the HU-25A, the
Coast Guard has traditionally favored aircraft types being operated by at
least one other branch of the armed forces. Provided the V-22 is fielded
by a Department of Defense component and subsequently acquired by the
Coast Guard, all parties could conceivably benefit from larger replacement
parts orders that would tend to reduce costs. Additionally, the Coast
Guard might be able to take advantage of Department of Defense depot level
test and maintenance facilities. In this regard, the Osprey offers
advantages similar to those provided by the Coast Guard's HH-60J and HC-
130H. 29
In terms of supportability, the Coast Guard learned some valuable
lessons from its HH-65A and HU-25A acquisitions. Since both aircraft were
primarily designed for commercial applications, parts reliability under
Coast Guard operating conditions was untested. Therefore, some component
failure rates tended to be higher than expected and parts shortages were
not uncommon. Unfortunately, the Coast Guard experienced the other
extreme as well. Since Coast Guard inventory modeling capabilities were
limited, the service significantly over estimated other component failure
rates. Also, the Coast Guard was unable to adequately validate inventory
stocking levels recommended by the contractors. Today, a $95 million
^More than 70% of the Osprey is fabricated from composites. The wing
is made primarily from Hercules IM-6 graphite/epoxy solid laminate. The
fuselage and empennage incorporate additional AS4 graphite fiber
materials.
2<Various models of the HH-60 and C-130 are flown within the
Department of Defense.
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overstock situation can be directly attributed to the service's poor
inventory estimates early in the HH-65A and HU-25A programs. w (Halvorson,
telephone conversation, October 17, 1991)
Although these lessons learned represent sunk costs, they
highlight an interesting point. Demand forecasting is easy to do in
theory, but much harder to do in practice. If the V-22 first enters
service with the Department of Defense, then the Coast Guard could receive
access to actual tilt rotor support and maintenance costs.
The V-22 conceivably offers a supportability advantage over the
HH-65A and the HU-25A. Since both the HH-65A and the HU-25A are produced
in France, long lead times are sometimes necessary to ensure adequate
parts supplies. With these two aircraft, the Coast Guard is committed to
a foreign sole source manufacturer whose lead times result in higher
inventory costs (Halvorson, telephone conversation, October 17, 1991).
The V-22 could offer lead times comparable to those affiliated with the
HH-60J and HC-130H, rather than those affiliated with the HH-65A and the
HU-25A.
Lastly, the V-22 program involves two prime contractors, Bell and
Boeing. Although both contractors are working closely to develop the tilt
rotor, plans eventually call for Bell and Boeing to compete against each
other on future production runs. Therefore, the competitive nature of the
V-22 program might eliminate or greatly reduce the problems accompanying
sole source procurements similar to the HH-65A and the HU-25A.
7 . MANPOWER
Table 8 outlines the direct work billets associated with the
service's aircraft types. They represent targets which the V-22 would
have to match or beat. In the simplest terms, direct work billets account
for those personnel that would accompany an individual air asset to a
Coast Guard air station. However, direct work billets are not an all
*>The inventory value is $600 million,
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inclusive measure of manpower because they do not account for command and
control or support billets.
TABLE 8 DIRECT WORK BILLETS PER AIRFRAME
Billets HH-65A HH-60J HC -25A HC-130H V-22
Pilots 2 3 2 3 2.3
Enlisted 10 17 11 22 15.8
Personnel
Source 1 1 1 1 2
Source: 1: Commandant, USCG (G-OAV)
2: Commandant, USMC
In the Marine Corps, the V-22 appears to decrease manpower
requirements compared to conventional helicopters. Today, the Marine
Corps has 4,500 uniformed people involved in direct medium lift support.
It is expected that the Osprey will reduce manpower requirements by
approximately 750 people. (Placing V-22 Costs in Perspective , Executive
Summary, July 30, 1990 p. 7)
The Marine Corps approaches aircraft maintenance differently than
the Coast Guard. The Marines use three maintenance levels, while the
Coast Guard uses two. The Marine's maintenance strategy involves a line
level, an intermediate level and depot level facilities. The following
list addresses the work performed at each maintenance level:
• Line level - General maintenance, phase inspections, quality
assurance, corrosion control, hydraulic, airframe and power plant
maintenance.
• Intermediate level - Component repairs.
• Depot level - Major airframe overhauls.
In comparison, the Coast Guard uses a line level, which is capable of
performing some component repairs, and depot level facilities.
Although Coast Guard and Marine Corps maintenance strategies are
different, the proposed structure of a V-22 squadron provides some insight
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into the direct support necessary to maintain the Osprey. Plans call for
V-22 squadron's to be made up of 12 aircraft. Squadron personnel would
consist of 32 officers, 28 of whom would be pilots, and 190 enlisted
members. The enlisted force is divided so that 134 members would be in
line maintenance and 56 members would be in intermediate level
maintenance. (Kiley, telephone conversation, October 23, 1991)
Taking a straight average that includes the line and intermediate
maintenance levels, a single Marine Corps' V-22 is supported by 2 . 3 pilots
and 15.8 enlisted people. Provided V-22 program hours within the Coast
Guard and the service's aviation environment were similar to the operating
conditions in the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard could use approximately
the same number of pilots and enlisted members for its version of the tilt
rotor. If the different maintenance structures in the two services are
taken into account, with half the Marine Corps intermediate maintenance
level being considered depot level activity in the Coast Guard, then each
V-22 assigned to a Coast Guard air station could potentially be supported
by 2.3 pilots and 13.5 enlisted members. Roughly speaking, the averages
suggest that the Osprey requires slightly less manpower support than the
Coast Guard's medium range recovery resource, the HH-60J.
8. CREW
Plans call for the Navy's combat search and rescue version of the
V-22 to be operated by a crew of five, two pilots and three enlisted
aircrew members. A five member crew, possibly a pilot, copilot, load
master, hoist operator and scanner, seems sufficient for the Coast Guard
version as well.
9 . COST SUMMARY
As discussed in Chapter III, many opinions exist about the cost
effectiveness of the V-22. The cost information gathered in this chapter
was primarily used to provide a first look at the V-22 in comparison to
existing Coast Guard air assets. Although this cost information does not
meet the rigid standards of a formal cost benefit analysis, it does
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highlight three important areas: acquisition cost, field level maintenance
and depot level maintenance.
At $34 to $45 million each, the V-22 unit acquisition cost is
much greater than the acquisition cost of a HC-130H. The V-22 would
probably be difficult for the Coast Guard to justify. However, if
sufficient quantities are produced so that unit acquisition costs approach
$16 million, the tilt rotor begins to become much more cost effective.
The second and third major issues focus on field level and depot
level maintenance costs. Since projected Marine Corps costs are still
under review, the degree of maintenance cost uncertainty associated with
the V-22 remains high. Interestingly, this assessment is shared by
commercial airline operators. At Rotor and Wing International's Civil
Tilt Rotor Symposium in June of 1990, civil airline operators indicated
that as long as the Osprey ' s operating costs were greater than equivalent
capacity turboprops, it would be unwise to purchase the V-22 (Snyder,
personal interview, September 3, 1991).
Several cost issues would be intimately tied to the number of
tilt rotors purchased and the employment strategies adopted by the Coast
Guard. The V-22 could potentially allow the Coast Guard to perform its
air related missions with fewer aircraft than currently employed. This
potentiality could be a significant marginal benefit in favor of the V-22.
Another possibility involves replacing more than one existing air resource
with the tilt rotor. This action could also lead to cost savings directly
attributable to the V-22. Under both scenarios, training costs might
decline making the case stronger for the V-22. Lastly, given the V-22's
speed advantage over conventional helicopters, fixed costs could
potentially be reduced through air station closures. However, extensive
analysis of these issues turned out to be beyond the scope of the thesis.
If the V-22 is produced, it creates a complex Coast Guard
acquisition decision. However, the sunk costs and relatively young age
associated with the service's existing aircraft are strong economic
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arguments to retain the use of these assets. Among the Coast Guard's
current aircraft, the HU-25A will be the first to reach the end of its
useful service (2001). Therefore, the Coast Guard has sufficient time to
evaluate the cost factors related to the V-22.
C. A MEASUREMENT FOR A FLEET WIDE COMPARISON
To determine the number of V-22's that would be required to replace
each existing aircraft fleet, three potential measures were considered.
These measures were equal cost, equal lift and equal range. Since Coast
Guard aircraft operation? involve rescue, surveillance and interdiction,
equal range was selected as a means to compare fleet sizes. Equal lift
was ruled out because it did not seem to capture the essence of Coast
Guard flight operations. Equal cost was rejected because the cost data in
the previous section was incomplete. Again, after reviewing the mission
requirements previously discussed in Chapter IV, range seemed to be the
most appropriate measure for fleet wide comparisons.
Based on established program rates discussed earlier in the chapter
and listed in Appendix G, Table 9 provides the annual range of a single
aircraft of each particular type, the fleet wide range of existing
resources, a V-22 range equivalent fleet size and the funded allowance
currently in the field. Annual fleet wide range was obtained by
multiplying the funded allowance by the annual range of a individual
aircraft of each type.
Assuming that a single V-22 could be programmed to fly 750 flight
hours per year (more than the HH-60J helicopter but less than a HU-25A
jet), a single V-22 could theoretically fly 187,500 nautical miles in one
year. Dividing current annual fleet wide total ranges by 187,500 nautical
miles yielded the V-22 range equivalent fleet size. However, no allowance
was made for attrition spares or aircraft being rotated through overhaul.
As expected, fewer V-22's (approximately 40% as many aircraft) are
required to fly the same distance as the HH-65A fleet. The same
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TABLE 9 FLEET SIZE EQUIVALENT RANGE MEASUREMENT























80,625 87,500 328,000 232,000
6,231,875' 2,800,000 10,496,000 5,916,000 :
80 32 41 30
33 15 56 32
Calculated with 4 HH-65A's at 325 hrs/yr and 3 at
275 hrs/yr.
Calculated with 1 HC-130 at 400 hrs/yr.
Assumes that the V-22 was programmed to fly 750
flight hours per year.
observation holds true for the HH-60J fleet (approximately 50% as many
aircraft). But, a V-22 fleet intended to replace the HU-25A or the HC-
130H would have to contain more aircraft than currently employed in either
case.
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Performance characteristics indicate that the tilt rotor has several
advantages over the Coast Guard's conventional helicopters. However, when
compared to the service's fixed wing assets, the V-22's advantages are
less clear. Substituting the V-22 would mean foregoing the speed of the
HU-25A or the lift capacity of the HC-130H. On the other hand, the V-22
would provide a recovery capability not offered in the current mix of
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aircraft as well as the ability to transport relatively heavy loads to
remote sites.
As far as costs are concerned, more research is required. Added
capabilities aside, the initial acquisition cost of the V-22 represents a
big hurdle during times of federal fiscal constraints. But, the tilt
rotor offers potential cost savings that could enhance its af fordability
.
As additional cost information becomes available, a clearer case could be
made for or against the V-22. In any event, the sunk costs associated
with the Coast Guard's existing aircraft probably makes them very
attractive, at least until they reach the end of their useful service
life.
Nevertheless, the V-22 could potentially bring several desirable
features to the service's aviation environment. Therefore, the next
chapter proposes possible V-22 employment strategies to assimilate the
tilt rotor into Coast Guard aviation.
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VII. ASSIMILATING THE V-22 INTO THE COAST GUARD
Since a favorable V-22 production decision remains possible, this
chapter takes a subjective look at potential tilt rotor employment
strategies the Coast Guard could adopt. If the V-22 is produced at an
affordable price, the tilt rotor has the potential to become an integral
part of the Coast Guard's aviation resources.
This chapter looks at three broad employment schemes or strategies
that take advantage of the tilt rotor's capabilities to meet the mission
needs discussed in chapter four. These strategies include:
• Using the V-22 as the service's primary recovery resource.
• Using the V-22 as a medium range recovery and/or surveillance
resource.
• Using the V-22 to fill gaps not covered by current air assets.
Since the Marine Corps is still reviewing the V-22's operating and
maintenance costs, the chapter approaches each potential strategy in a
general manner. Political considerations could make some strategies more
appealing than others. Quantitative marginal benefits and marginal costs
could favor others. In any case, the situation will be clearer as more
accurate cost data becomes available.
Although some cost information is incomplete, this chapter reviews the
strengths and weaknesses associated with the each employment strategy.
This chapter's goal is to establish a valid picture of the hurdles the
tilt rotor must overcome to become an operational Coast Guard aircraft.
A. THE V-22 AS THE SERVICE'S PRIMARY RECOVERY RESOURCE
Under the terms of this strategy, the V-22 would become Coast Guard's
primary air recovery vehicle. In essence, the strategy consolidates the
mission needs embodied by the short range and medium range recovery
resources. However, the strategy faces one major operational drawback.
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The tilt rotor cannot deploy or operate from existing Coast Guard flight
decks. Since the service is unlikely to forego this capability, a small
contingent of HH-65A's, HH-60J's or some other rotary wing resource would
still be reguired to meet deployment commitments. Although this strategy
fails to totally eliminate the need for short range recovery resources,
the strategy has merit.
At first glance, the idea of significantly reducing the role of the
HH-65A or replacing this 8,900 pound helicopter with a 60,000 pound tilt
rotor seems like "gold plating". Even if the V-22's mission included
medium range recovery, V-22 benefits would have to be significant for the
strategy to be worthwhile. Both the HH-65A and the HH-60J currently
satisfy the service's mission requirements. Additionally, both
helicopters are relatively young. The HH-65A entered Coast Guard service
in 1985 and the HH-60J became operational in 1991. Therefore, the HH-65A
and the HH-60J have respectfully 14 years and 20 years of useful service
life remaining. 31
However, a viable tilt rotor would offer several advantages worthy of
a cost/benefit analysis. As indicated in the previous chapter, 48 V-22's
could potentially replace 80 HH-65A's and 32 HH-60J's. While the size of
the V-22 fleet might have to be increased to account for the likelihood of
simultaneous responses, the number of V-22's required to perform the short
and medium range recovery missions should be significantly less than the
number of helicopters used today. Furthermore, fewer aircraft could mean
much lower training, maintenance, supply and manpower costs.
Other cost savings could be achieved through air station closures.
For example, the map in Appendix H locates current air stations. Although
the distance between these facilities varies, the average separation in
3i Since entering Coast Guard service, the HH-65A has been a
maintenance intensive helicopter. It has experienced engine problems and
suffered inter-granular corrosion in the composite airframe. A telephone
conversation with Lieutenant Palmquist, Coast Guard Aeronautical
Engineering Branch, indicated that decision makers were looking for
alternatives to the HH-65A.
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the continental United States is approximately 203 nautical miles (eight
air stations are separated by less than 180 nautical miles). The average
half way point between air stations is just over 100 nautical miles. At
HH-65A and HH-60J cruise airspeeds the mid point between air stations is
reached in 48 minutes. In the same time, the V-22 traverses 202 nautical
miles. Therefore, tilt rotor air stations could be positioned further
apart than today's rotary wing facilities. However, this relocation would
increase geographic areas of responsibility for the air stations remaining
open, which could offset the benefits of the V-22's speed advantage over
the HH-65A and the HH-60J.
While fixed cost reductions associated with air station closures are
appealing, other factors could make this an extremely unattractive option.
Rescue service, law enforcement and environmental response capabilities
would decline near the closed facility. This decreased responsiveness
could generate adverse public opinion and a backlash political reaction.
Politically, it could be difficult to phase out certain facilities,
especially those with long established histories and those that are
integral parts of relatively small communities. Large metropolitan areas
are not likely to give up adjacent Coast Guard air stations either. Over
the past decade, the Coast Guard has repeatedly tried to close Air Station
Chicago.
Indeed, obtaining Congressional approval to close air stations due to
the V-22 introduction could turn out to be politically impossible. From
a parochial perspective, air station closures may not be in the best long
term interest of the Coast Guard. As air stations are closed, the Coast
Guard could find itself with decreasing Congressional support.
Finally, the strategy carries a certain element of risk. Since only
a minimal number of conventional helicopters would be set aside for
shipboard deployment operations, recovery efforts would primarily fall on
the tilt rotor. A fleet wide tilt rotor maintenance or supply problem
could adversely impact aircraft availability. Operations could suffer
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significantly. In comparison, today's strategy of using two types of
recovery resources mitigates the effect of problems in either community.
B. THE V-22 IN THE MEDIUM RANGE RECOVERY AND/OR SURVEILLANCE ROLES
Of the four mission areas described in chapter four, the medium range
recovery and surveillance missions offer the best fit for the tilt rotor.
The V-22 could easily fill both roles, if slower speeds could be tolerated
for the medium range surveillance mission and shipboard compatibility
foregone in the medium range recovery mission. Again, the result could be
fewer aircraft and a corresponding reduction in support costs.
A tilt rotor offers several advantages over the two aircraft now in
place. In search and rescue operations, the V-22 has significant speed
and range advantages over the HH-65A and the HH-60J. Just as importantly,
the V-22 eliminates the need for fixed wing aircraft to fly long searches
and helicopters to recover survivors. (Goward, 1990, p. 83-85). The tilt
rotor performs both tasks while extending the recovery zone well beyond
that reachable with the HH-60J.
For law enforcement the V-22 offers interesting tactical capabilities
not available in either the HH-60J or the HU-25A. In the Southeastern
United States and the Bahamas, the V-22 could be used instead of the HU-
25A to intercept, identify and, if appropriate, shadow aerial smugglers as
well as carry the apprehension team. 3: Even though the HU-25A has a
marked speed advantage over the V-22, many of the aircraft used by
smugglers are relatively slow so that they can use small airports or
unimproved fields. Consequently, the V-22's decrease in performance
should not be overly detrimental to mission accomplishment. T n fact, the
option to carry the apprehension team aboard the intercepting aircraft
could enhance law enforcement operations by eliminating the need for a
3:When a suspect aircraft is detected, current doctrine calls for a
HU-25A to be launched to make an identification and if necessary follow
the aircraft. A helicopter carrying an apprehension team then rendezvous
with the HU-25A and waits for the suspect aircraft to land.
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cumbersome rendezvous at the smuggler's landing site. 33 (Goward, 1990, pp.
83-85)
The V-22 brings several other important advantages to law enforcement.
It could be used to patrol larger areas than the HH-60J and thereby
increase the service's law enforcement presence. The tilt rotor's ability
to hover and its slow flight capability would also allow it to easily make
detailed identifications. Fixed wing aircraft on the other hand, must
remain above stall speeds.
Three areas of interest are relevant to logistics missions, where the
V-22's volume and cargo capacity could be more advantageous than that
associated with the HH-60J and the HU-25A. First, the HU-25A is not a
cargo aircraft, while the V-22 provides greater cargo capacity (Saylor,
telephone conversation, September 17, 1991). The V-22 could carry sensor
suits currently installed aboard the HU-25A while still retaining the
ability to perform logistics missions.
Second, Alaska air stations, which are scheduled to replace their HH-
3F's with HH-60J's in the spring of 1992, are already concerned that the
HH-60J does not have the internal capacity to support aids to navigation
missions or other logistics activities. 34 In contrast, the V-22 has the
volume capacity to handle these missions.
Third, a Bell and Boeing study concluded that the V-22 was a excellent
platform for transporting environmental clean up equipment to isolated
pollution sites (Samouce, 1990, pp. 1-12). Although the HH-60J can
deliver material to remote locations, it does not offer the total range
and payload capacity of the V-22. The HU-25A is also out classed. It has
33A Bell and Boeing study indicates that the V-22 is large enough to
perform the Coast Guard's law enforcement mission. According to Bell and
Boeing the tilt rotor can carry a sophisticated avionics suit, including
the APG-66 radar and infrared sensors, the apprehension team and airframe
mounted weapons for protection (V-22 Military Studies and Analysis,
Executive Summary, 1990, pp. 7-1 to 7-5).
34If the Coast Guard begins using standardized containers (CONEX
boxes) on HH-60J external load missions, this issue may be resolved.
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a very limited cargo capacity and it must land and takeoff from prepared
surfaces
.
However, an interesting dilemma develops when the V-22 is considered
solely for the medium range surveillance mission. Here, the HU-25A
maintains some advantages over the tilt rotor.
While tilt rotor advocates claim that the V-22's speed is sufficient,
there are times when faster is better. In maritime search and rescue, law
enforcement, environmental protection and national defense, speed can be
important. In rescue situations it shortens enroute time, in law
enforcement cases it decreases intercept times and in pollution response
efforts, like the Exxon Valdez grounding and the Persian Gulf, it reduces
pollution response and mapping times. 35
The HU-25A also gives a commander the ability to dispatch an aircraft
and quickly obtain on scene information. In several scenarios, this
information could critically influence further Coast Guard responses or
significantly enhance prospects for a successful operation. Yet, after
arriving on scene, the HU-25A operates at speeds comparable to those of
the V-22.
Lastly, a Coast Guard version of the Osprey would be compatible with
V-22's in the Department of Defense. The potential for mutual maintenance
and support arrangements could lower costs for all parties and undoubtedly
facilitate interoperability.
Although not an identical replacement for the HU-25A, the V-22 meets
most of the medium range surveillance mission requirements. Since the HU-
25A nears the end of its service life at the turn of the century, it could
represent the first opportunity for the tilt rotor to enter Coast Guard
service. If the slower speed of the V-22 can be accepted, then the Coast
Guard could gain an aircraft with greater versatility than the Falcon jet.
35Two HU-25B "Aireye" Falcon's with the APS-131 side looking aerial
radar were used to map the Persian Gulf oil spill.
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The Coast Guard's newest helicopter, the HH-60J, creates a problem.
The sunk costs associated with the helicopter give it a tremendous edge
over the V-22. That advantage means that the V-22 might not be able to
replace the HH-60J outright. The HH-60 series has proven to be reliable
and maintainable; consequently, it would be unreasonable to retire this
helicopter before the end of its 20 year service life. Besides, this
rotary wing series is widely used by Department of Defense components and
the Coast Guard; therefore, it should be supportable for several years.
However, the HH-65A's poor maintenance and availability track record
raises a significant question. The HH-60J could be shifted to the short
range and recovery mission to make room for the tilt rotor. This action
would again give the Coast Guard a mix of primary air assets that were
common to the Department of Defense (the HH-60J, the V-22 and the HC-130).
Of course, the service would have to accept reductions in deployability
and increase the size of flight decks on future cutter designs to more
easily accommodate the larger helicopter. 36
The operational risk associated with using the V-22 in one or both of
the medium range capacities would be less than making the tilt rotor the
service's sole recovery resource. If fleet wide maintenance of supply
problems developed, a short range recovery resource and a long range
surveillance resource would still be in place to substitute for the tilt
rotor.
As a final thought, three mission gaps exist with the service's
current mix of aircraft, law enforcement, limited mid range logistics
capabilities and Alaskan operations. While these gaps are not major
shortcomings, they could represent an opportunity for the tilt rotor to
36These shipboard design changes represent substantial marginal costs
that could make it uneconomical to phase out the HH-65A. Not only would
larger flight decks be desirable, but shipboard support systems, such as
JP-5 fuel tanks and fresh water wash holding tanks, would also have to be
modified to meet the higher demands associated with the HH-60J.
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prove itself in the Coast Guard aviation environment. However, a more
diversified mix of aircraft could result in higher overall aviation costs.
In the final analysis, the V-22 could become an extremely capable
medium range recovery and/or surveillance resource. But, the HH-60J and
the HU-25A are both effective resources currently operating in the field.
Therefore, the Osprey could have a difficult time replacing either
resource.
C. SUMMARY
In essence, three tilt rotor assimilation strategies appear possible.
These include making the V-22 the service's primary recovery aircraft,
moving the V-22 into the medium range recovery and surveillance missions
or using the V-22 to fill operational gaps in the existing asset base.
However, each strategy has unique attractions and distinct risks that
involve several operational, economic and political issues. While the
primary recovery resource strategy could offer lower costs through air
station closures and reductions to the number of aircraft now in service,
it still requires that a small helicopter be retained for shipboard
operations. Fewer air stations could also mean less Congressional
support. In addition, eliminating both helicopters reduces the redundancy
inherent in the dual recovery system.
The medium range recovery and surveillance missions probably offer the
best operational fit for the Osprey. Since the HU-25A has a recovery
capability, possible options include replacing the HH-60J, the HU-25A or
both current assets. The V-22 out performs the HH-60J and it reasonably
approaches HU-25A performance. But, the HH-60J is brand new and the HU-
25A is more efficient (lower costs, less fuel consumption and greater
speed) than the V-22 in a pure surveillance role. However, the V-22 has
greater cargo capacity than the HU-25A and it reduces the need for dual
(fixed wing and rotary wing) rescue and law enforcement responses.
Additionally, the strategy carries less operational risk than using the
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tilt rotor as the service's primary recovery aircraft. A mix including a
short range recovery helicopter, tilt rotor and long range surveillance
aircraft offers some redundancy not available with the primary recovery
resource option. Air station closures are also not as strongly tied to
this approach; therefore, the political atmosphere could be much more
receptive to the medium recovery and surveillance strategy.
Finally, the V-22 could fill operational gaps not covered by the
service's current air assets. However, federal budget constraints would
probably make this strategy very difficult to implement.
In the final analysis, the V-22 could significantly enhance the Coast
Guard's operational capabilities. However, it must be affordable before
it is assimilated into the Coast Guard aviation inventory.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter is divided into two sections: the first section answers
the studies primary research questions and the last section outlines areas
for further research.
A. CONCLUSIONS
The thesis tried to answer the following questions about the V-22 tilt
rotor aircraft:
• What is the history of tilt rotor development?
• What are the major economic arguments shaping the tilt rotor debate?
• What are the potential implications on the Coast Guard's current mix
of aircraft of a favorable Department of Defense or a Congressionally
mandated decision to produce the V-22?
• In terms of cost and performance, how does the V-22 compare with the
four major aircraft types already in Coast Guard service?
• Is there an affordable role for the V-22 in Coast Guard aviation?
While the study did not reveal a definitive answer to each research
question, the thesis outlines several economic and political issues that
are shaping the tilt rotor production decision.
The following sub-sections discuss the major conclusions yielded by
the research. The conclusions fall into five broad areas consistent with
the primary research questions.
1. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The V-22 embodies over 55 years of combined Bell and Boeing tilt
rotor experience. This experience includes 9,000 hours of wind tunnel
tests and 1,000 hours of flight simulator development. The first four V-
22 prototypes have also accumulated more than 500 flight hours during more
than 400 flights since the first V-22 made its maiden flight on March 19,
1989. Flight test milestones include:
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• Successful conversions from vertical takeoff mode to fixed wing
turboprop and back.
• A top speed of 349 knots in a 12,000 foot-per-minute dive.
• Level fight speeds up to 283 knots.
• Flight up to 21,500 feet.
• Flight maneuvers up to 2.3 "G" loads.
• A cross country flight of 1210 nautical miles from Wilmington,
Delaware to Dallas, Texas.
• Simulated instrument flight. (Harvey, August 1991, p. 26)
Furthermore, the V-22 technology base stems from 40 years of research and
development extending from the XV-3 aircraft through the Army and NASA XV-
15 proof of concept aircraft.
While early hybrid helicopter/airplane designs showed that an
aircraft could be converted from helicopter mode to airplane mode in
flight, performance penalties and reliability issues restricted their
usefulness. None ever entered production. However, the XV-15 and the
V-22 seem to have validated the technical feasibility of the tilt rotor
design. While the research suggested some concern over the recent crash
of prototype number five, the tilt rotor remains technologically viable.
In fact, Bell and Boeing officials insist that the V-22 is an extremely
reliable and maintainable aircraft.
2. A REVIEW OF THE MAJOR ECONOMIC ISSUES SURROUNDING THE V-22
While the technological issues surrounding the tilt rotor appear
resolved, guestions about the cost effectiveness of the design persist to
this day. While several independent studies indicate that the V-22 is the
most cost effective resource for meeting Marine Corps medium lift
reguirements, the issue is not as clear when it comes to Department of
Defense priorities or national public policy concerns.
Currently, the Marine Corps and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense dispute the need for the V-22. The Marine Corps favors it, but
Secretary Cheney believes it is too expensive. While there are some
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indications that the Secretary of Defense may reverse his V-22
cancellation decision, such action is not assured.
With major V-22 contractors in Pennsylvania, Texas and Indiana
and other contractors dispersed across 45 states, the tilt rotor enjoys
considerable support on Capital Hill. A Tilt Rotor Technology Coalition,
headed by U.S. Representative Curt Weldon (Republican - Pennsylvania),
views the tilt rotor as vital to the nation's commerce (Harvey, June 1990,
p. 34). 37 But, the aircraft remains controversial as Congressional
decision makers and the Bush administration look to reduce defense
spending.
While politics could decide the V-22, several economic arguments
are being used to foster tilt rotor support. These arguments, explained
in more detail in Chapter III, include:
• Potential V-22 commercial applications.
• Positive externalities.
• Opportunity to improve the trade balance.
• Reductions in Unemployment.
• A means to maintain the national defense industrial base.
• Improved contractor relations.
While the value of reducing unemployment through V-22 production is
debatable, the other arguments appear to have merit. However, their
benefits are extremely difficult to quantify. Similarly, there is no
assurance that the V-22 will be marketable in the private sector. There
are commercial concerns that the tilt rotor could be more expensive to
operate than existing turboprops and capital expenditures are necessary to
implement "vertiport" service. Therefore, job creation and commercial
applications should not be used as the primary justification for a V-22
production decision. While the idea of federally supported "spin off"
,7The Tilt Rotor Technology Coalition includes approximately 100
bipartisan members of Congress and industry leaders.
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technologies sounds like a good acguisition strategy, it is a questionable
near term economic activity. Although one could argue that private and
public sector support was appropriate for the long term research and
development necessary to produce V-22 prototypes, continued support would
isolate the tilt rotor from the near term market signals that will
determine whether or not it is a commercial success (Gates, 1988, p. 40.)
Rather, Congress should only authorize V-22 production if there is a
legitimate national defense need that justifies tilt rotor costs. The
medium lift requirement of the Marine Corps seems to warrant the expense.
3. IMPLICATIONS OF A FAVORABLE V-22 PRODUCTION DECISION
The thesis research indicates that the V-22 must clear several
hurdles before it can significantly alter the composition of the Coast
Guard's existing mix of aircraft. Unless Bell and Boeing change their
stance about requiring a Pentagon commitment before continuing V-22
development, the first and foremost obstacle is a favorable production
decision by the Department of Defense or Congress. While this decision is
possible, it would be impossible to predict with certainty the outcome of
the tilt rotor debate. However, Rear Admiral Milligan, the Chief Budget
Officer for the Navy, hinted, during a lecture at the Naval Postgraduate
School, that a favorable tilt rotor production decision was still feasible
and that a Marine Corps tilt rotor squadron could be activated by 1997.
Therefore, the immediate implications of a favorable V-22
production decision on the Coast Guard are two fold. First, the Coast
Guard would need to flight test the aircraft to validate performance in
the service's aviation environment. Although technical aerodynamic issues
were outside the scope of the thesis, the V-22's disc loading of 20 pounds
per square foot (high by helicopter standards) generates a downwash that
approaches 80 knots (Prouty, June 1990, p. 43). While a neutral area
exists directly beneath the V-22, the Coast Guard must ensure that the
tilt rotor's downwash permits operations near people in the water, small
pleasure boats and commercial fishing vessels.
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Provided the tilt rotor received a favorable operational
evaluation, the next step would be for the Coast Guard to formally
evaluate tilt rotor employment strategies to determine if marginal
benefits exceed their marginal costs. Assuming that these evaluations
showed that the V-22 was cost effective, the tilt rotor could alter the
Coast Guard's current mix of aircraft.
Although the V-22 is not an identical replacement for any of the
service's current aviation assets, it possesses characteristics that would
allow it to function as a medium range recovery resource or medium range
surveillance resource. Indeed, if the service can accept a slower dash
speed than that of the HU-25A, the V-22 could function in both capacities,
eliminating the need for two aircraft.
Alternatively, the V-22 could evolve into the Coast Guard's
primary recovery resource replacing both the short range recovery and
medium range recovery resources. 38 While using the V-22 in the short
range and recovery role initially seems excessive, the strategy
potentially could reduce fixed costs through facility closures,
commonality of equipment, reductions in manpower and lower training costs.
However, the strategy eliminates the two helicopter system 39 and increases
risks by lowering recovery system redundancy. Lastly, this employment
scheme may not be politically viable or even in the best political
interests of the service.
4. PERFORMANCE AND COST COMPARISON SUMMARY
Generally, the V-22 out performs the Coast Guard's conventional
helicopters, the HH-65A and the HH-60J. The tilt rotor flies twice as
fast as these helicopters while maintaining the recovery capability
essential to Coast Guard flight operations. The V-22 also offers longer
38A contingent of conventional helicopters would be required for
deployment purposes.
39The use of a short range recovery helicopter and a long range
recovery helicopter.
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range and greater cargo capacity than the helicopters now in service. As
discussed in Chapter VI, these advantages offer potential dividends in
search and rescue, law enforcement, environmental protection and national
defense. But, the HH-65A consistently deploys aboard the service's flight
deck equipped cutters and the HH-60J must be compatible with 270 and 378
class cutters. The V-22 is too large and too heavy to deploy on Coast
Guard ships.
The HU-25A and the V-22 pose an interesting dilemma. The HU-25A
is much faster and more efficient as a surveillance platform. On the
other hand, the V-22 can make recoveries. If a slower speed is acceptable
(410 knots verses 250 knots), the tilt rotor reduces the need for joint
fixed wing and helicopter rescue responses. No longer would fixed wing
assets fly long searches and vector helicopters to the scene to perform
recoveries. The V-22 could perform both functions.
The speed differential means tradeoffs in other areas as well.
In law enforcement, the HH-25A has the speed to rapidly close targets.
Although the V-22 may be fast enough, it will not make the intercept as
quickly as the HU-25A. Nor will the V-22 map pollution spills or deliver
an on scene observer as fast as the Falcon jet.
But the V-22 is much more flexible than the HU-25A. In law
enforcement endeavors, such as the Operations Bahamas, Turk and Caicos
Island Task Force, HU-25AS intercept and follow suspicious aircraft and
helicopters transport the apprehension team to the landing site. Again,
the V-22 could eliminate the need for two resources because the
apprehension team could be carried aboard the tilt rotor. While the V-22
has multiple logistics applications, the HU-25A is not a cargo aircraft at
all.
The research suggests that the V-22 is not a suitable replacement
for the Coast Guard's long range surveillance resource. While a V-22
carrying four internal fuel tanks is self deployable to most areas of the
world, it does not match the overall surveillance, logistics or
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transcontinental capabilities of the HC-130H. However, the V-22 could
complement the HC-130H. For example, in a pollution response scenario HC-
130H's could transport people, equipment and material to the nearest
airfield. Tilt rotors could then deliver the goods to clean up sites.
While the V-22 offers more than conventional helicopters, it also
costs more. In fact, V-22 unit acquisition costs were significantly
higher than any of the aircraft now in Coast Guard service (twice that of
a HC-130H, currently the Coast Guard's most expensive aircraft). However,
projected V-22 initial provisioning costs were similar to the those
associated with the HH-60J. Although the Marine Corps uses a different
maintenance strategy than the Coast Guard, the research suggests that the
V-22 could be supported and flown under existing manpower constraints
(more research is required to determine the specific technical specialties
necessary to maintain the V-22). Unfortunately, the unavailability of
V-22 operating and maintenance costs limited the cost comparison section
of the thesis. While the composite airframe, in line replaceable units
and 35 hour maintenance cycle associated with the V-22 could render
savings over existing aircraft, a definitive answer was not forthcoming.
Until more conclusive data is available, the matter is open for debate.
5. AFFORDABILITY
V-22 af fordability depends on several issues: those inherent to
the V-22 and those related to how the tilt rotor is employed. Whether the
V-22 is considered a replacement for one aircraft, a combination of
aircraft or acquired to fill gaps not covered by current air assets, the
V-22 will only be affordable if the marginal benefits derived from the
tilt rotor exceed the marginal costs. More succinctly, the tilt rotor
must offer an incremental improvement in mission performance that
justifies the cost of acquiring and operating the aircraft over its life
cycle. Even if the V-22 is judged to be a more capable platform than a
current aviation asset or combination of assets, that factor alone does
not necessarily merit tilt rotor acquisition. The V-22 could be more
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capable and commensurately more costly. The result could be a poor public
policy decision as federal outlays were diverted from other worthy Coast
Guard programs to support the service's V-22 variant.
While the cost comparison section of the thesis was inconclusive,
there are reasons to be concerned about tilt rotor costs. For one, the
V-22 Program Finance Officer indicated that a Coast Guard order of 30 to
50 tilt rotors would not appreciably effect unit acquisition costs, as
long as other markets outside the Department of Defense failed to opened
up (Metts, telephone conversation, September 3, 1991). Therefore,
depending on Coast Guard options for weapons systems, construction and
initial spares, the service would be looking at unit costs approaching $34
to $45 million. Arguments about life cycle costs and tilt rotor's
advantages aside, Coast Guard decision makers would probably find it
extremely difficult to procure an aircraft that could cost twice the price
of a HC-130H. Furthermore, 30 tilt rotors would cost between $1.0 and
$1.4 billion in 1990 dollars or just a little more than one third of the
Coast Guard's entire 1990 operating budget (Coast Guard, 200 Years of
Service, Overview 1989-1990, September 1989, p. 16).
Concerns over operating and maintenance costs also remain. At
a recent national tilt rotor symposium, commercial airline operators
questioned whether or not the V-22 was cost competitive with existing
turboprop aircraft (Personnel interview, Lieutenant Commander Snyder, June
3, 1991). Finally, the Coast Guard is in a different position than the
Marine Corp. Its aviation assets are relatively young and are not in need
of immediate replacement. Therefore, sunk costs would make it difficult
for the V-22 to be more economical than resources already in the field.
Admittedly, there are also reasons to be optimistic about tilt
rotor costs. While the HH-65A and HU-25A are flown exclusively by the
Coast Guard, the V-22 would be compatible with Department of Defense
needs. All the services could benefit from mutual support and the
economic savings from larger spare parts orders. If the tilt rotor is
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commercially successful, unit cost could fall to $16 million, making the
aircraft much more attractive. In addition, some of the employment
schemes presented in chapter seven suggest possible ways to reduce fixed
costs. Fewer V-22's could potentially replace the larger number of
aircraft in service today. The result could be a net savings.
While these possibilities deserve serious attention, more
accurate V-22 cost information is needed before these employment
strategies can be evaluated in detail. Even if the V-22 is affordable,
political realities could prevent some of the more ambitious plans from
being accepted by the Coast Guard, the Department of Transportation or the
Congress
.
A favorable V-22 production decision is a key signal for Coast
Guard managers. With it, the V-22 becomes an alternative resource and its
potential Coast Guard applications should be formally evaluated. 40
Without a Department of Defense or Congressional production decision, the
Bell and Boeing tilt rotor may never be built.
An affordable tilt rotor could have major ramifications on the
Coast Guard's mix of aircraft and its aviation resource employment
strategies. Provided marginal benefits exceeded marginal costs, the two
employment strategies listed below seemed the most likely ways for the V-
22 to enter Coast Guard service.
• Use the V-22 to fill gaps not covered by existing Coast Guard
aircraft
.
• Use the V-22 to replace the HU-25A.
While the gap filling strategy adds another aircraft type to the
inventory, it increases recovery range for rescue operations, potentially
reduces the need for joint response resources, provides a logistics
^This study drew on information applicable to the Marine Corps and
the Navy versions of the V-22. A formal analysis would involve working
with Bell and Boeing to develop a tilt rotor derivative to meet the
service's particular needs.
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capability to move pollution clean up equipment to remote locations and
introduces a law enforcement platform that could simultaneously carry an
apprehension team and perform intercept missions. Similar to the way
helicopters were slowly but steadily integrated into the service following
World War II, the gap filling strategy offers the chance to introduce the
tilt rotor to Coast Guard aviation.
The first opportunity for the V-22 to replace an existing asset
will probably occur when the HU-25A approaches the end of its useful
service life, near the end of the century. Of course, the V-22's slower
speed will have to be acceptable and V-22 costs will have to be
attractive.
The Coast Guard's current position on the V-22 appears sound.
Decision makers in the Coast Guard Office of Aviation Programs believe
that the tilt rotor's capabilities are attractive; but, the service is not
in a position to acquire the V-22 unless the aircraft is first procured by
a Department of Defense component. Even then, costs will have to be
examined very closely and weighed against some unique benefits. In
essence, the management challenge may be to create a realistic vision
that takes advantage of the tilt rotor's uncommon capabilities while
simultaneously remaining within legitimate budget constraints.
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Provided the V-22 enters production, several areas must be addressed
before the tilt rotor can enter Coast Guard service. These areas include:
• Formulating a mission need statement.
• Establishing the hardware requirements for a Coast Guard version of
the Osprey.
• Developing a basing strategy for the tilt rotor.
• Conducting a formal cost benefit analysis.
Besides the tilt rotor, the thesis suggested two other aviation
related issues which also need to be examined:
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• Historical cost information is not accessible to decision makers in
aviation management offices.
• The Coast Guard's budget allocation process does not ensure that
aviation program funds reach the service's air stations. Therefore,
it is difficult to validate aviation costs against the program
budget
.
Historical costs associated with the service's various types of
aircraft are dispersed across several offices at Headquarters (Aviation
Program Office, the Aeronautical Engineering Office, the Office of
Acquisition and the Chief of Staffs Office) and the Aviation Repair and
Supply Center in Elizabeth City, North Carolina. The documents containing
this data are archived and retrieval efforts would have exceeded the scope
of this thesis. A good management information system is needed to link
these offices so that decision makers have ready access to historical cost
data. For example, to determine HH-65A original spares levels, subsequent
alterations in stocking levels and the cost of HH-65A airframe
modifications (since acquisition), it would be necessary to review
original contracts warehoused in North Carolina. While the information is
available, it is not very accessible. Although not every document should
be saved, a data base needs to be established to provide historical
aviation cost information in a timely manner. This information would also
be readily available for cost analysis improvement efforts.
Secondly, the Coast Guard aviation budget is filtered through 10
district offices before it reaches the service's 27 air stations. While
this study used data derived from the aviation program budget to
approximate costs, there is no guarantee that program rates are actually
allocated to each air station. Therefore, any effort to compare budgeted
aviation dollars with actual expenditures is somewhat diluted because
district offices have the option of shifting aviation funds to other
areas. While district commanders want budget flexibility, the budget
allocation process makes it difficult to assess the potential impact that
major aviation resource changes could have on overall aviation costs.
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Therefore, the budget allocation process needs to be reviewed with an eye
toward planning for actual aviation expenditures. The objectives would be
to develop a more accurate budget process that provides a clearer picturer
of Coast Guard aviation's fixed and variable costs. 41
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The HH-60J Medium Range and Recovery Helicopter
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The HC-130H Long Range Surveillance Aircraft
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The V-22 Tilt Rotor Aircraft (diagrams extracted from V-22 Program Office
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EXCERPT FROM THE V-22 JOINT SERVICES ADVANCED VERTICAL LIFT AIRCRAFT
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APPENDIX C
RESCUE CASE INFORMATION BY DISTANCE OFFSHORE, FY86-FY90
150 151 - 300 300 + TOTAL






216 77 491 254 160 641
229 117 401 242 131 738
147 63 252 176 68 395
182 67 294 208 242 678










FY89 AVIATION RESOURCE SEARCH AND RESCUE STATISTICS
Aircraft Type CaBes No. of Sorties Time on Sortie Lives Lost After
HC-130H 516 775 3,979.1 80
HU-25A 781 1,022 2,379.6 41
HH-52A 1 204 256 354.4 24
HH-65A 3,192 4,181 7,242.1 121
HH-3F 2 1,434 1,781 4,448.6 75
Other 3 3 5.6
Aircraft Type Lives Saved Person Otherwise Assisted Property LoBt (S000)
HC-130 366 1,051 77,583
HU-25A 315 893 23,977
HH-52A 139 122 1,411
HH-65A 847 3,250 118,534
HH-3F 467 1,154 83,172
Other 17







'These cases represent short range and recovery responses. The
HH-52A has been retired in favor of the HH-65A.




ESTIMATED WEIGHT INFORMATION FOR A V-22 CONFIGURED FOR
SEARCH AND RESCUE (provided by the Bell-Boeing Joint Program Office)
EST PILOT PRODUCTION WEIGHTS
MGTOW (SL/90 F, 20 kts W.O.D.): (Note 1)
HV-22 WEIGHT EMPTY
REMOVE 16 TROOP SEATS




































TOTAL 4 4 7
OPERATING WEIGHT:
NORMAL NAVY CONFIG FUEL LOAD (MAX INTERNAL)
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CABIN AUX FUEL TANKS:
CABIN AUX TANK WT EMPTY:
MAX CABIN CAPACITY:
602 GAL CAPACITY EA. (USEABLE)
4093 LBS. FUEL CAPACITY EA. (USEABLE)
415 LBS. EA.
4 TANKS
Note U No wind MGTOW VTO weight is:
- NORMAL SAR MISSION WT:
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The Responsiveness of the HV-22
Far Exceeds That of the Helicopter
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Maintenance ($/f light hr)
Depot Level
Maintenance ($/f light hr)
Measured Work Billets :
AIRCRAFT
HH-65A HH-60J HU-2 5A HC-130H
645 700 800 800
94 154 310 870
94.00 154.00 310.00 870.00
93.19 211.00 74.99 119.98
1,039.35 954.00 1,236.15 994.25
2+0+10 3+0+17 2+0+11 3+0+22
'Based on a federal contract price of $1.00 per gallon.
^he first value is for pilots, the second for warrant officers and the
third for enlisted maintenance personnel.
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MAP OF COAST GUARD AIR STATIONS
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